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LIST OF ACTORS 
Board of Kmart’s Directors: The body ultimately responsible for filing 
bankruptcy, and writing the plan for 
reorganization.  
Creditors Committee: Represented by Otterbourg, Steindler, Houston 
& Rosen, P.C. of NY. Co-Counsel is Winston & 
Strawn of Chicago IL. The committee's financial 
advisor is KMPG LLP. The committee was 
appointed January 31, 2002. 
Charles Conaway: Kmart CEO 2000-2001. 
ESL Investments: A hedge fund managed by Edward Lampert, who 
has been called the next Warren Buffett, which 
specializes in buying distressed organizations.  
Equity Committee: Represented by Traub, Bonacquist & Fox, LLP 
of NY. Co-Counsel is Goldberg, Kohn, Bell, 
Black, Rosenbloom & Moritz, Ltd. of Chicago IL. 
The committee's advisor was Saybrook 
Restructuring Advisors. The committee was 
appointed on June 17, 2002. 
Financial Advisors: Miller Buckfire Lewis & Co., LLC and Dresdner 
Kleinwort Wasserstein, Inc. 
Financial Institutions Committee: Represented by Jones Day of Cleveland OH, 
Chicago IL, and Washington DC. The 
committee’s advisor was FTI Consulting, Inc. 
Joseph Antonini: Kmart CEO 1987-1995. 
Kmart: As a whole, the company included the following 
entities: Kmart Corporation, Kmart Corporation 
of Illinois, Inc., Kmart of Indiana, Kmart of 
Pennsylvania LP, Kmart of North Carolina LLC, 
Kmart of Texas LP, Bluelight.com LLC, Big 
Beaver of Florida Development LLC, The 
Coolidge Group, n/k/a, TC Group 1 LLC, 
Kmart  Michigian Property Services, L.L.C., 
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Kmart Financing 1, Troy CMBS Property L.L.C., 
Big Beaver Development Corporation, Big 
Beaver of Guaynabo Development Corporation, 
Bluelight.com, Inc., Kmart Holdings Inc., Kmart 
of Amsterdam, NY Distribution Center, Inc., 
Kmart Stores of Indiana, Inc. f/k/a Kmart 
Logistics Services, Inc., Kmart of Michigian, Inc., 
Kmart Stores of TCNP, Inc., f/k/a Kmart 
Trading Services, Inc., Kmart Overseas 
Corporation, JAF, Inc., VTA, Inc., Big Beaver of 
Caguas Development Corporation II Big Beaver 
of Carolina Development Corporation, Kmart 
Pharmacies, Inc. Builders Square, Inc., and 
Sourcing & Technical Services Inc. 
Kmart Creditor Trust: The entity the plan implemented to oversee 
unsecured creditors’ claims against Kmart.  
Mark Schwartz: Kmart President 2000-2001. 
Plan investors:  ESL & Third Avenue Trust. 
Restructuring Advisors: Alix partners LLC. 
Sebastian S. Kresge:  Founder of Kmart.  
Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher &Flom:   Counsel for Kmart.  
John William Butler, Jr. “Jack Butler co-leads Skadden’s global Corporate 
Restructuring practice, which works to provide 
innovative, practical legal solutions to clients 
involved in distressed company situations…. In 
December 2010, Mr. Butler was one of 10 lawyers 
profiled for delivering “creative solutions” to 
clients during the credit crisis in the Financial 
Times’ inaugural “U.S. Innovative Lawyers” 
report, where the firm ranked first nationwide for 
innovation and received top rankings in corporate 
restructuring, M&A and financial services.”1 
1 http://www.skadden.com/index.cfm?contentID=45&bioID=695 
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J. Eric Ivester “J. Eric Ivester represents clients in business 
reorganizations, acquisitions and divestitures. Mr. 
Ivester has represented debtors, creditors, 
investors, sellers, purchasers and other financial 
advisors in all stages of complex restructuring 
transactions, from Chapter 11 reorganizations to 
out-of-court negotiations, workouts and 
divestitures.”2 
Mark A. McDermott “Mark McDermott represents public and private 
corporations and their principal stakeholders in 
troubled company M&A, restructuring and 
financing transactions. He has represented 
corporations in out-of-court restructurings, 
prepackaged and prearranged Chapter 11 cases, 
and traditional Chapter 11 cases….Mr. 
McDermott recently was named one of America’s 
“Outstanding Young Restructuring Lawyers” by 
Turnarounds & Workouts magazine. He also was 
named to the Euromoney and Legal Media Group’s 
2009 Expert Guide to the World’s Leading Insolvency 
and Restructuring Lawyers.”3 
Judge Susan Pierson Sonderby: The judge of the bankruptcy court.  She earned 
her B.A. from the University of Illinois in 1969 
and graduated with a J.D. from The John 
Marshall School of Law in 1973.  She was 
originally appointed for a fourteen year term as a 
bankruptcy judge in the Northern District of 
Illinois in 1986.  She was elevated to Chief 
Bankruptcy Judge in 1998 and re-appointed by 
the Seventh Circuit in 1999.  Her current term 
expires in 2014.   
Subsidiaries: The 37 affiliated debtors who are owned by 
Kmart Corporation but are legally separate 
identities.  
2 http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=45&bioID=704
3 http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=45&bioID=2197
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Unsecured Creditors’ Committee: The body that represents all the unsecured 
creditors’ claims.  
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KEY TERMS 
Automatic Stay: Provides legal protection to debtors.   Found in 
Bankruptcy Code §362.  In short, it bars most 
creditor actions to enforce prepetition obligations 
or debts owed by a debtor and allows the Debtor 
to continue to operate while reorganizing.  
Bankruptcy Court: The United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois (Eastern Division). 
Critical Vendors: Vendors which Kmart regarded as essential to the 
success of the reorganization.   
DIP Financing: A loan provided to Kmart to support continued 
operations during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy case.  Kmart received approximately 
$2 billion dollars in DIP Financing. 
Disclosure Statement: A written statement by Kmart providing 
sufficient information to enable relevant investors 
to make informed decisions about the plan. 
Effective Date: The date that the plan of reorganization went into 
effect and the automatic stay is lifted.  
New Holding Company: A successor corporation created pursuant to the 
terms of the Plan of Reorganization.  After the 
plan was approved, The New Holding Company 
changed its name back to “Kmart Holdings.”  
New Operating Company An intermediary company that houses upper-level 
management of the reorganized enterprise that 
will in turn own, directly or indirectly, various 
corporate and other entities that will own and 
operate the business of reorganized Kmart. 
Petition Date: January 22, 2002: the date Kmart filed its 
bankruptcy petition. 
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Plan of Reorganization: The findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
detailed the future rights and obligations of the 
reorganized Kmart.   
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Chapter One 
THE RISE OF KMART 
Rule No. 1: Never lose money.  Rule No. 2: Never forget rule No. 1. 
Warren Buffett 
The American Dream is the belief that a person can go from dirt poor to filthy rich in 
a single lifetime.  This dream is the aspiration of millions, but it is only realized by a select 
few.  The stories of those who have lived the American Dream, such as the Rockefellers and 
Carnegies, have been passed down in hagiographic detail.  A less known story is that of 
Sebastian S. Kresge, the founder of Kmart.  In 1897 he started a five and ten cent store with 
an $8,000 loan, and he incorporated S.S. Kresge 
on March 9, 1912.  By 1924, he had a personal 
worth of $5,000,000,000 in 2009 US dollars. 
Under the leadership of the company’s 
president, Harry Cunningham, the first Kmart 
store was opened in 1962.4  Kmart’s growth was 
explosive.  For example, 271 Kmart stores were 
opened in 1976 alone.5
By the 1980’s, Kmart was a retail giant, and the company was ready to use its financial 
power to support new ventures.  In 1984, Kmart acquired Walden Book Company and 
Home Centers of America.  In 1990, it purchased Sports Authority.  In 1991, it became the 
 
4 International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 47. St. James Press, 2002. 
5 Id. 
In 1957, S. S. Kresge leads his team around the 
swimming pool on his 26 acre estate. Co-author Jon 
Fisher’s great-grandfather is the fifth person from 
the right.  
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controlling partner in OfficeMax when it acquired 91% of the company.  In 1992, Kmart 
purchased Boarders Books.6 
By 1995, Kmart was the world’s fifteenth largest corporation.  The company’s gross 
sales totaled $34,313,000,000 and resulted in a profit of $2,960,000,000.7  By early 2002, 
Kmart was nation’s second largest discount retailer8 and the third largest general merchandise 
retailer.9  Kmart operated 2,114 stores, including 136 supercenters, with locations in each of 
the 50 United States, Puerto Rico, U. S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. 10  Kmart’s retail 
operations were located in 308 of the 324 metropolitan statistical areas in the nation. Kmart 
had relationships with more than 4,000 merchants worldwide and had more than 5,000 
leases and subleases with 3,240 landlords and subtenants.  Kmart had over 6,300 executory 
contracts and employed approximately 234,000 people on a payroll of 5 billion dollars in 
salaries and benefits.11 
Kmart’s success was based on two main strengths: buying power and brand 
awareness.12  First, the size of the company allowed it to buy goods cheaply and in bulk.  For 
more than a decade, Kmart had over 30 billion in net sales and contracted with over 4,000 
6 These acquisitions would later prove to be financial failures. See Chapter Two.
7 International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 47. St. James Press, 2002.
8 Wal-Mart was the largest discount retailer.
9 Wal-Mart was first, and Target was second.
10 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 7 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL)
11 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 7 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL)
12 International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 47. St. James Press, 2002.
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merchants.  Kmart was able to acquire exclusive brand rights for national prominent goods 
such as: Martha Stewart Living, Jaclyn Smith, Kathy Ireland, Disney non-character apparel 
for infants and children, Joe Boxer, and Route 66. 13  Second, Kmart’s rapid expansion 
provided universal brand awareness.  Over 95% of Americans lived within 15 miles of a 
Kmart.  Further, Kmart had circulars that reached into over 70 homes and a steady flow of 
e-commerce on its company website.14  Sebastian Kresge’s company was living the American
Dream. 
13 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 8 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL) 
14 Id at 6. 
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Chapter Two 
CIRCLING THE WAGONS: KMART BEGINS TO SLIP 
“Think of Kmart as a sick uncle.  He has been coughing and wheezing for years.  Now he has to have major 
surgery.  We hope he survives the knife.  But he will never be what he once was. " 
Tom Walsh, Free Press Columnist, January 2002.  
Like all good things, Kmart’s rise to power eventually came to an end. Kmart’s 
demise was caused by three main factors.  First, Kmart failed to develop a consistent 
company philosophy.  Second, Kmart developed a corporate culture with low levels of 
management accountability and high levels of compensation.  Third, Kmart was simply 
unable to compete with Wal-Mart.  In particular, Wal-Mart bested Kmart with superior 
supply chain development and management, revenue, and product turnover.  
A. Kmart is different from Wal-Mart and Target
One of Kmart’s central problems was the lack of a coherent corporate philosophy.In 
the early 2000’s, Kmart was awkwardly positioned between Target, which was known for 
reasonably priced style, and Wal-Mart, which was known for rock bottom prices.  In an 
attempt to compete on a different plane, Kmart experimented with investments in other 
companies, such as Office Max, Walden Books, and Sports Authority.15  However, Kmart 
did not develop these assets, and soon abandoned its investments.16
B. Corporate Payments
 
At the same time that Kmart was struggling to find its identity, Kmart’s corporate 
officers feasted on a tradition of expensive perks.  For instance, Joseph Antonini, Kmart’s 
15 See Chapter 1.   
16 International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 47. St. James Press, 2002. 
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Chairman and CEO from 1987-1995, traveled luxuriously with the choice of five corporate 
jetseven as the fortunes of the company began to decline 17  Further, Mr. Antionini 
complacently ignored technological advancements. For instance, he was proud that he never 
used an Automated Teller Machine, and he used an assistant to print his email. The 
corporation as a whole did not begin to use videoconferencing until the 2000’s.18
By the time that Kmart filed for bankruptcy, corporate compensation was high. 
Charles Conaway, the Chairman and CEO of Kmart at the beginning of 2002, collected 
nearly $23 million in compensation over 
the period of 11 months.  Several 
months before Kmart filed for 
bankruptcy, he received a $5 million 
retention loan.
 
19  He lived in a 29-room 
mansion and billed Kmart $523,000 in 
“temporary housing and living costs.” 
His original contract provided him $1.4 
million in annual salary, $6 million in up-front cash and stock bonuses, and a restricted stock 
award6 worth $5.4 million.20  Despite this approximately $12 million in salary for one year 
17 By comparison, Wal-Mart’s only aircraft was a two-seat propeller aircraft that Sam Walton flew himself.  While this is 
a limited snapshot of the men in charge at their respective companies, it illustrates the broad principal that Kmart was 
will to splurge into excess and Wal-Mart really believed in its “save more” philosophy.  See  Robert Dickie, Financial 
Statement Analysis and Business Valuation for the Practical Lawyer 158 (ABA 2002). 
18 Marcia Turner, Kmart's 10 Deadly Sins: How Incompetence Tainted An American Icon 136 (John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
2003). 
19 Max Oritz, Kmart's Road to Bankruptcy, The Detroit News, Aug. 12, 2002. 
20 By comparison, the previous CE Floyd Hall, earned approximately $3 million in salary and bonuses in 1999. 
Conaway’s “temporary housing” 
15 
worth of work, Conway was also promised an additional $15 million in cash and stock 
payments to cover “foregone compensation” from his previous employer.  
Mark Schwartz, the president of Kmart at the beginning of 2002, was also given 
enormous sums of money for driving the company to the brink of bankruptcy.  Over 16 
months, he made $10.8 million, including $4 million in retention bonuses and $1.4 million in 
unspecified housing costs.  As well, Kmart paid him $2.4 million in 2001 to reimburse him 
for his income taxes.21  The payments made to Schwartz and Conway are summarized on 
the following chart. 
Despite receiving personal fortunes, Schwartz and Conway also added luxury to the 
lives of other company executives.  They purchased two corporate jets to add to Kmart’s 
fleet and approved a program that awardedexecutives with Jaguars and Land Rovers as their 
company cars.  Besides these company programs, the pair also authorized over $20 million 
21 Max Oritz, Kmart's Road to Bankruptcy, The Detroit News, Aug. 12, 2002. 
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in retention loans to 23 other Kmart executives ranging in amount from $300,000 to $3 
million.22 Charles Conway stated at his first annual meeting that Kmart was going to “close 
the gap” on Target and Wal-Mart.23 
C. Kmart vs. Wal-Mart
Without a coherent, distinguishing corporate philosophy, Kmart was unable to 
compete with the rise of Wal-Mart during 1988, Kmart was larger than Wal-Mart and earned 
higher revenues: Wal-Mart had net income of $627 million on $16 billion in revenues, 
whereas Kmart had a net income of $692 million on $26 billion in revenue.24  By 1994, 
however, Wal-Mart had earnings of $2.3 billion and revenue of $68 billion, while Kmart had 
a $1 billion loss and revenues of $28 billion.25 
Kmart’s demise at the hands of Wal-Mart was caused by three main weaknesses. 
First, Wal-Mart developed more effective supply chains.  Second, Wal-Mart developed a 
higher revenue stream.  Third, Wal-Mart experienced a much higher turnover of inventory.  
i. Supply Chain
Wal-Mart’s central strength was its well-constructed supply chains. Wal-Mart had 
almost no supply storage areas because its vendor-managed inventory system made suppliers 
responsible for delivering product exactly when it was needed.  Wal-Mart’s system was 
known as “just in time” inventory management.26 
22  Kmart’s road to bankruptcy Detroit News, Aug. 12, 2002. Bill Vlasic, Mark Truby, & David Shepardson 
23 “My commitment is within 720 days to get the business fixed structurally and culturally… we’re definitely on track.” 24 
Robert Dickie, Financial Statement Analysis and Business Valuation for the Practical Lawyer 157 (ABA 2002). 
25 Id. 
26 Now in Bankruptcy, Kmart struggled with supply chain Steve Konicki, information week, Jan 28, 2002 
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In contrast, at Kmart it was not unusual for a supplier's sales representative to find 
shelves empty but products piled up in stockrooms.  Even major brands such as Martha 
Stewart were not supplied properly.27 
As well, Kmart’s management simply refused to utilize supply chain technology even 
as it was embraced by Wal-Mart.For instance, Kmarthada contract with i2 Technologies Inc. 
regarding logistics-monitoring and transportation-management software as well as a custom 
version of TradeMatrix supply-chain software.  But after signing the contract, Kmart decided 
to write off the $130 million dollar investment and not implement any changes until it 
reengineered its business structure.28 
ii. Revenue Stream & Overhead
In 1988, Kmart spent $0.231 in overhead for every dollar earned, but Wal-Mart only 
spent $0.163.  Naturally, this allowed Wal-Mart to have lower prices and higher profits.  In 
part because of lower pricing, Wal-Mart was able to outgrow Kmart.29 
From 1996 to 2002 Kmart’s sales increased 14.2% and its sales per square foot 
increased 27.7% to $235.30  During 2002, however, Kmart was deep into the red and posted 
losses of $3.2 billion.  Part of the reason why Kmart’s growth was insufficient to keep it in 
the black was the intense pressure it was facing from Wal-Mart.  During the same 1996-2002 
time period, Wal-Mart increased its sale per square foot by 30.9% from $311 to $407.  At the 
27 Even Martha complained of distribution problems and the difficulty customers had locating her products. For 
such customers, she said, "If you are frustrated, keep looking."   
28 Steve Konicki, Now In Bankruptcy, Kmart Struggled With Supply Chain, Information Week, Jan. 28, 2002, at 13. 
29 Kmart was growing at 9% a year, while Wal-Mart was growing at 40% a year. 
30 Robert Dickie, Financial Statement Analysis and Business Valuation for the Practical Lawyer 163 (ABA 2002). 
18 
time Kmart filed for bankruptcy, Wal-Mart made $172 per year more than Kmart per square 
foot of store.  
From 1991 to 2002, Kmart increased its revenues from $24.9 billion to $36.2 billion, 
an increase of 45%,31  but Wal-Mart increased its revenues more than five-fold.   As well, 
Wal-Mart was able to supply goods cheaper and faster than Kmart.32
iii. Asset Turnover
 
The asset turnover of a store is the amount of sales revenue generated for every 
dollar's worth of assets.  In general, discount realtors such as Wal-Mart and Kmart strive to 
have a high asset turnover.  In 2002, Kmart had an asset turnover of 4.9.33  In contrast, Wal-
Mart’s turnover was 6.6. Thus, in terms of volume increases and the ability to spread costs 
over more sales, Kmart was simply unable to compete with Wal-Mart.34
In conclusion, it was evident to Kmart that the company was losing ground to Wal-
Mart throughout the 90’s and early 2000’s.  Unable to compete with Wal-Mart on prices, 
Kmart began to look into cutting its fixed costs.  Kmart determined that, to remain 
competitive with Wal-Mart, fixed costs would have to be cut by $347 million (9%).  Despite 
the efforts of management, Kmart simply lacked the necessary logistics expertise, the sales 
volume, and the management commitment to achieve this kind of cut.
 
35  Even if Kmart 
31 When adjusted for inflation, Kmart’s increase in revenue was 11%. 
32 Id. 
33 The rate Wal-Mart had in 1991. 
34 Id. 
35 Robert Dickie, Financial Statement Analysis and Business Valuation for the Practical Lawyer 164 (ABA 2002). 
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could make the necessary cuts, it still lacked the facilities needed to generate the necessary 
sales and could not afford to build new stores.36 
36 Id. at 165 
20 
Chapter Three 
BLUE LIGHT ALWAYS VS. EVERYDAY LOW PRICES 
“It takes as much imagination to create debt as to create income.” 
Leonard Orr 
In an effort to restore the fortunes of the company and find a way to compete with 
Wal-Mart, Kmart hired Charles Conaway as the new CEO.37
To implement Conaway’s new plan, Kmart began the “blue-light always” campaign.
  Conaway decided that Kmart 
should return to its roots and become the nation’s number one low-priced realtor.  To 
implement this plan, Conaway decided to implement drastic price cuts in an attempt to lure 
customers from Wal-Mart.  This decision had disastrous results.  
38 
The company planned to put 50,000 items on sale nationwide.  This signaled a major change 
in retail strategy for Kmart.39
The new program was not supported by Kmart’s board or by their vendors.  The 
board of directors did not approve of the program and wanted a trial-run before it began. 
Further, Kmart did not even consult with its suppliers to get their feedback or ask for their 
support.
 
40  Despite the lack of support, Conaway moved forward with the program.  
37 Conaway was the former president and COO of CVS, the second largest pharmacy chain in the United States. 
International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 47. St. James Press, 2002.  
38 International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 47. St. James Press, 2002. 
39 The traditional strategy was a promotion-driven business model where Kmart would offer numerous items highly 
discounted prices in the hopes when shoppers came in, they would buy other items. 
40 Marcia Turner, Kmart's 10 Deadly Sins: How Incompetence Tainted An American Icon 157 (John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
2003). 
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This maneuver proved to be a critical mistake.  Not only did Wal-Mart move quickly 
and ruthlessly to match or undercut Kmart’s lowered prices, but Kmart also compounded its 
mistake by simultaneously cutting back its distribution of expensive advertising circulars. 
Customers, accustomed to receiving the advertising in the Sunday paper, simply stopped 
shopping.  Same-store sales fell throughout the final months of 2001, including during the 
crucial holiday selling season.41
In short, Kmart could not match Wal-Mart on price, could not increase its sales 
enough to cover its costs, and could not cut its overhead enough break even.
 
42  In 1991 
Kmart had a market capitalization of $8.6 billion.  As of 2002, Kmart’s market capitalization 
was reduced to a mere $200 million, a destruction of 98% of its value.43  
41 Marcia Turner, Kmart's 10 Deadly Sins: How Incompetence Tainted An American Icon 157 (John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
2003). 
42Id. 
43 Id. 
22 
Chapter Four 
DEBT IS A FOUR LETTER WORD 
“Buy what thou hast no Need of and ere long thou shalt sell thy Necessaries.” 
Benjamin Franklin 
Like a consumer who solves financial difficulties by signing up for a new credit card, 
Kmart soon found itself buried in debt obligations.  Kmart entered into a three-year credit 
agreement44 on December 6, 1999 that provided it with a revolving facility of $1.1 billion.45  
On November 13, 2001, Kmart entered into a one year agreement with various lenders46 
that extended it $400 million on a revolving credit basis. 47   In 2002, Kmart owed 
approximately $2.1 billion in principal under unsecured indentures48 to the Bank of New 
York.  On November 1, 1994, Kmart was also a party to commercial development revenue 
refunding bond indentures49
In the late 80’s and early 90’s, Kmart acquired several companies only to abandon 
them a few years later.
with an outstanding principal balance of $1.8 million. 
50  When Kmart later sold these companies, it did so at a loss and 
44 Held by Chase Securities Inc., JP Morgan Securities, The Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank of America, Bank Boston N.S. 
and Bank of New York. 
45 As of the petition date, Kmart owed the fund $813 million. Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint 
Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 10 , In re Kmart 
Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL). 
46 Id. 
47 By 2002, Kmart was indebted $393 million to its lenders plus accrued interest and applicable costs, expenses, and 
fees. Id. 
48 An indenture is a written agreement between the issuer of a bond and the bondholders which specifies the interest 
rate, maturity date, and convertibility.  In essence, an unsecured indentured is simply an unsecured bond.   
49 Id. 
50 These companies included The Sports Authority, Borders, and Office Max.  See Chapter One.  
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remained obligated to the debt incurred in these leveraged acquisition transactions.  As of 
early 2002, Kmart owed $70 million in industrial revenue bonds and was indebted to lease 
agreements that had a present value of $314 million.51
In sum, Kmart was heavily indebted on a three-year loan it received in 1999.  When it 
became obvious that it could not meet its financial obligations, it acquired a new loan for a 
single year in the hopes of turning the corner and getting back into the black.  After Kmart 
performed poorly in the 4th quarter of 2001, a critical quarter for retailers, it was boxed in.  It 
could not afford to pay its loans, debt obligations, or its creditors.
 
52  
51 Over the full life of the leases, the value would balloon out to $519 million.  Id. 
52 The total debt to equity (D/E) ratio is a comparison between a company’s combined long and short-term debt to 
shareholders’ equity, or book value.  The D/E ratio is 1.0 when debt equals equity, and high debt companies have 
higher D/E ratios than low debt companies. Kmart using the discount retailer’s January 2001 fiscal year report, ($8 
share price), and again using its October 2001 quarterly report, ($7).  Kmart’s January 2001 D/E of 0.5 put it only 
marginally into the high-debt category, its October D/E ratio was .8.  See Disclosure Statement with Respect to First 
Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 
8 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL). 
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Chapter Five 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
How did you go bankrupt? Gradually, then suddenly. 
Ernest Hemingway 
For Fiscal Year 2001, Kmart had gross sales of approximately 36 billion, administered 
14. 3 billion in assets and had outstanding liabilities of 10 billion dollars.  However, declining
sales had resulted in a liquidity crisis.53  Furthermore, major vendors were beginning to halt 
shipments of goods. 54  On January 21, 2002, Fleming Companies, Kmart’s sole grocery 
provider, sent the management of Kmart a letter stating that it would be halting all 
shipments to Kmart stores.  Later that day, Kmart’s board voted to file for relief under 
chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 55
Although Kmart’s bankruptcy was likely inevitable, two factors probably contributed 
to Kmart’s filing on January 22, 2002.  First, Kmart had already begun talks with potential 
financers.  By late January, Kmart had secured promises for $2 billion in post-petition 
financing.
 
56  Second, Kmart was facing increasing demands from its vendors.  Declining 
sales had resulted in a liquidity crisis, and major vendors were beginning to halt shipments of 
53 4th quarter sales were substantially lower than expected and Kmart did not have cash on hand to pay its obligations 
on its loans. 
54 Fleming wanted. 
55 Constance L. Hays, Big Grocery Supplier Files for Bankruptcy Protection (NYT, April 2, 2003).  Fleming itself was 
forced to file for bankruptcy about a year later when Kmart cut off its distribution arrangement with Fleming.  Id. 
56 Id. 
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goods.57  On January 21, 2002, Fleming Companies, Kmart’s sole grocery provider, sent the 
management of Kmart a letter stating that it would be halting all shipments to Kmart stores. 
Later that day, Kmart’s board voted to file for relief under chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code.58 
57 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 8 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL). 
58 Constance L. Hays, Big Grocery Supplier Files for Bankruptcy Protection (NYT, April 2, 2003).  Fleming itself 
was forced to file for bankruptcy about a year later when Kmart cut off its distribution arrangement with Fleming.  Id. 
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Chapter Six 
BLACK FRIDAY 
You owe me ten shillings, 
Say the bells of St. Helen’s. 
When will you pay me? 
Say the bells of Old Bailey.  
When I grow rich, 
Say the bells of Shoreditch.  
Pray when will that be? 
Say the bells of Stephney.  
I am sure I don’t know, 
Says the great bell at Bow… 
Here comes a candle to light you to bed, 
Here comes a chopper to cut off your head. 
Nursery Rhyme 
The previous chapters have summarized the events that brought Kmart to the brink 
of bankruptcy in the beginning of 2002.  Unable to find a solution to its financial difficulties, 
Kmart filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on Friday, January 22, 2002 in 
the Northern District of Illinois.  The case was assigned to Judge Susan Pierson Sonderby.59
A. Kmart’s Story
 
It is likely that Kmart was brought to the brink of bankruptcy by corporate 
mismanagement, the lack of a company philosophy, and a failed price war with Wal-Mart.60  
Unsurprisingly, this was not the story that Kmart presented to the bankruptcy court. 
According to Kmart, the company needed to file for bankruptcy protection in 2002 due to 
circumstances largely out of its control. Kmart asserted that Wal-Mart and Target had 
provided significant competition in the years leading up to the bankruptcy.  Additionally, the 
59 See List of Characters.  
60 See Chapter Four.   
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company argued, the market forces were to blame, including “the evaporation of the surety 
bond market, and an erosion of supplier confidence, as well as intense competition in the 
discount retailing industry, unsuccessful sales and marketing initiatives, the continuing 
recession, and recent capital market volatility.”61
Despite the market limitations claimed by Kmart, the company was still an industry 
leader in discount retailing.  Through reorganization, Kmart hoped to “improve 
[its]operating performance and to realize significant cost savings.
 
62  Kmart intended to use 
the restructuring process to bring its debt in line with its cash flow generating capability and 
competitors.  Kmart felt that the reorganization “should create financial flexibility for future 
operating requirements and capital expenditures and improve liquidity.”63
B. First Day Motions
 
Like all Chapter 11 bankruptcies, Kmart’s started with a flurry of activity.  On the 
first day, Tuesday, January 22, 2002, Kmart filed twenty-three motions.64  Many of these 
61 Motion For Order (i) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Petition Wages, Salaries, and Employee Benefits; (ii) 
Authorizing 
the Debtors to Continue the Maintenance of Employee Benefit Programs in the Ordinary Course; and (iii)Directing All 
banks to Honor Pre-petition Checks for Payment of Pre-petition Employee Obligations, Filed Jan. 22, 2002.  
62 Id. 
63 Id.The goals of reorganization listed in the first day motions are vague.  There are at least two explanations for this: (1) 
the first day motion was badly written; (2) Kmart really didn’t any clear reorganization strategy beyond shedding debt 
through bankruptcy.The second option is more likely.  See Chapter Thirteen.    
64 Kmart’s motions included: MOTION for an Order Authorizing the Debtors to Mail Initial Notices in Lieu Providing 
a Mailing Matrix Required under Local Rules; MOTION for an Order Granting Extension of Time to File Schedules 
and Statements; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.102 and 105[a], Bankruptcy Rules 2002[m] and 9007, and 
Local Rules 101, 400, and 402 Establishing Omnibus Hearing Dates and Certain Notice, Case Management and 
Administrative Procedures; MOTION for an Administrative Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105[a] and 331 Establishing 
Procedures for Interim Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Professionals; MOTION for an Order Pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. 105[a]327[a]and 331 Authorizing Retention of Professionals Utilized by Debtors in the Ordinary Course of 
Business; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.105, 345 and 363 Authorizing [A] Continued Maintenance of 
Existing Bank Accounts, [B] Continued Use of Existing Cash Management System, [C] Continued use of Existing 
Business Forms, [D] Continuation of Intercompany Transactions with Non-Debtor Subsidiaries and Affiliates, and [E] 
Waiving Investment and Deposit Requirements; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.105[a],365 and 507[a][6]. 
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were ruled upon a mere three days later. This section will be divided into two parts. First, the 
traditional foundations for first day motions will be examined.  Second, several of the typical 
first day motions filed by Kmart will be summarized.  
i. Traditional Foundations for First Day Motions
Under the bankruptcy code, the general rule is that a debtor cannot pay the pre-
petition claims of a creditor.65  First day critical vendor and employee wage payment orders 
and the like evolved as exceptions to this rule.  A typical first day motion in general allows 
Authorizing Continuation of Certain Customer Practices; MOTION for Order Under 11 U.S.C. 365[a] Authorizing the 
Debtors to Assume Certain Services Agreement with Non-Executive Chairman; MOTION for Order [i] Authorizing 
the Debtors to Pay Pre-petition Wages, Saleries, and Employee Benefits,[ii] Authorizing the Debtors to Continue the 
Maintenance of Employee Benefit Programs in the Ordinary Course; and [iii] Directing All Banks to Honor Pre-petition 
Checks for Payment of Pre-petition Employee Obligations; MOTION for Order Under 11 U.S.C. 105[a]363[b][1] and 
363[a] Authorizing Debtors to Implement a Key Employee Retention Plan; MOTION for Order Under 11 U.S.C. 265[a] 
Authorizing the Debtors to Assume Certain Employment Agreements with Senior Management Employees; MOTION 
for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.105[a],366 503m and 507 of the Bankruptcy Code [1]Prohibiting Utilities from 
Alteringm, Refusing or Discounting Servcies on Account of Pre-petition Invoices and [11]Establishing Procedures for 
Determining Requests for Additional Assurance; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105 Authorizing 
Payment of Pre-petition Claims of Consignment Vendors and Customer Service Providers and Approving Procedures 
Concerning Consigned Goods; MOTION for Order Under 11 U.S.C. 105[a] Authorizing the Payment of Pre-petition 
Claims of Certain Critical Trade Vendors; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105[a],541,and 507[a][8] 
Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Pre-petition Sales, Use, Trust Fund and Other Taxes and Related Obligations; 
MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105[a] Authorizing Payment of Certain Pre-petition Shipping and 
Delivery Charges; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 363 and 546[g] Authorizing Debtors to Implement a 
Vendor Return Program and Granting Related Relief; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105[a],503[b] and 
546[b] Authorizing Payment of Contractors and Service Providers in Satisfaction of Liens; MOTION for Order 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.105[a]and 363 Authorizing Payment of Pre-petition Obligations Necessary to Obtain Imported 
Merchandise; MOTION Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105,362,503 and 546 for entry of Interim and Final Orders [1] Providing 
Administrative Expense Treatment for certain Holders of Valid Reclamation Claims and [11] Establishing Procedures 
for Resolutions and Payment of Reclamation Claims; MOTION for Entry of Interim and Final Orders [1] Providing 
Administrative Expense Treatment for Paca and Pasa Trust Claims Procedures and [11] Establishing Procedures for 
Resolutions and Payment of Paca and Pasa Claims; MOTION for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105[a] and 365[a] 
Authorizing [A] Rejection of Certain Unexplained Real Estate Leases and [B] Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other 
Unexpired Leases; and MOTION for Interim and Final Order Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-petition Financing 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.105,361,362,364[c][2] and 364[c][3].  See Docket Report.   
65 Brandi McCoy, The Last Day for Fist Day Orders: Attacks on the Practice of Paying Pre-petition Claims of Certain “Critical 
Vendors”, 3 DePaul Bus. & Com. L. J. 321, 323 (2005). 
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the debtor to avoid complying with one or more requirements of the bankruptcy code.66  A 
significant sub-category of first day order are those that allow payments of prepetition claims 
immediately, without confirmation of a plan of reorganization, in the case of, for example, 
“critical” vendors and employees that largely fund their lives paycheck-to-paycheck.  
The first debtors to propose first day orders were railroads under the prior 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which, as amended, remained the law until it was replaced by the 
Bankruptcy Code of 1978, effective 1979. 67  The railroads claimed that their successful 
reorganization was essential to the public interest, and so public policy justified the payment 
of some pre-petition claims to ensure that the employees, employers, and vendors associated 
with the railroad were supportive of the reorganization.68  The practice of allowing these 
payments became known as the “Doctrine of Necessity,” and the bounds of the doctrine 
were not clearly defined.  And perhaps clear definition was not necessary or desirable to 
those that championed the doctrine’s use and development. When the typical railroad 
organization case involved hundreds of millions of dollars, the distribution of a few 
thousand via first day orders was not a matter of much concern.69 
The use of first day orders spread swiftly to non-railroad cases.  They claimed that the 
court should allow pre-petition claims because “the debtor relies on certain vendors for 
critical products and services, and unless the debtor is permitted to pay its pre-petition debts 
66 Brandi McCoy, The Last Day for Fist Day Orders: Attacks on the Practice of Paying Pre-petition Claims of Certain 
“Critical Vendors”, 3 DePaul Bus. & Com. L. J. 321, 323 (2005). 
67 Brandi McCoy, The Last Day for Fist Day Orders: Attacks on the Practice of Paying Pre-petition Claims of Certain 
“Critical Vendors”, 3 DePaul Bus. & Com. L. J. 321, 323 (2005). 
68 Brandi McCoy, The Last Day for Fist Day Orders: Attacks on the Practice of Paying Pre-petition Claims of Certain 
“Critical Vendors”, 3 DePaul Bus. & Com. L. J. 321, 323 (2005). 
69 See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy From Olympus, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 977, (961) (2010). 
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to these essential vendors, they likely will stop supplying the debtor, and the debtor’s 
chances of successfully reorganizing will be impaired.” 70   The practice spread and, 
eventually, first day orders were increasingly applied to all cases, irrespective of size, as a 
matter of course.71
First day orders became standard in bankruptcies, even as the size of the payments of 
pre-petition debts grew in size, and many judges granted them as a matter of course.  
Perhaps some judges granted the motions because they rarely meet with firm opposition as 
they are filed before the creditor’s committee is formed.  Further, “judges are unlikely to 
push back out of the fear of being “labeled ‘toxic judges’ and find themselves out of the 
business of hearing large Chapter 11 cases.”
  Courts gradually interpreted the railroad “Doctrine of Necessity” to be 
incorporated by the Bankruptcy code through 11 U. S. C.  §105(a), the “all writs” statute, 
which states in part that “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” 
72  Regardless of the reason, first day orders 
became standard in bankruptcies, even as the size of the payments of pre-petition debts grew 
in size.73
ii. Typical First Day Motions
 
It is in this context, in which first day orders were granted as a matter of course, that 
Kmart filed its first day motions.  Kmart filed many motions, including a request to employ 
70 Andrew J. Currie & Sean McCann, Hold on to Those Payments, Critical Vendors: Capital Factors v. Kmart, Am. Bankr. Inst. 
J., 2003 ABIJNL. LEXIS 100, at *9-*10. 
71 See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy From Olympus, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 977, (961) (2010). 
72 See id.at 977.   
73 See id. 
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Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 74  and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 75  permission to 
continue customer practices (such as honoring gift certificates and warranties),76 permission 
to pay employee wages and benefits,77 permission to pay the expenses of professionals,78 and 
permission to pay pre-petition debts to certain “critical vendors.”79
1. Motion for Order Authorizing Payment of Pre-Petition
Employee Wages and Benefits
  For the purposes of 
illustration, this paper will analyze (1) the motion to pay employee wages and benefits, (2) 
the motion to permission to pay the expenses of professionals, (3) the motion to obtain DIP 
financing, and (4) the motion to pay “critical vendors.”  These motions were chosen either 
because they represented the typical first day motions raised by Kmart or because their 
outcome became particularly significant for later cases.  
As one of their first day motions, Kmart moved the court to enter an order 
“authorizing the Debtors to (a) pay the various pre-petition claims of the Debtor’s 
employees and independent contractors…and (b) continue the Debtors’ various Employee 
74 Application for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 329 Authorizing the Employment and Retention of 
Skadden, Arps, Slate Meagher &Flom (Illinois) and Affiliated Law Practice Entities as Attorneys for the Debtors (Filed 
Jan. 22, 2002). See also, Cast of Characters. 
75 Application Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a) For Order Under Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code 
Authorizing the Employemnt and Retention of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Financial Advisors to the Debtors 
(Filed Jan 22, 2002).See also, Cast of Characters. 
76 Motion for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 365 and 507(a)(6) Authorizing Continuation of Certain 
Customer Practices (Filed Jan. 22, 2002).  
77 Motion For Order (i) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Petition Wages, Salaries, and Employee Benefits; (ii) 
Authorizing the Debtors to Continue the Maintenance of Employee Benefit Programs in the Ordinary Course; and 
(iii)Directing All banks to Honor Pre-petition Checks for Payment of Pre-petition Employee Obligations, 7 (Filed Jan.
22, 2002).
78 Motion for an Administrative Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 331 Establishing Procedures for Interim 
Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses of Professionals, 11 (Filed Jan 22, 2002). 
79 Cite. 
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benefit plans and programs.”80  The average monthly payroll for Kmart’s 242,000 employees 
was $342.9 million. At the time of filing, approximately $43.0 million remained due for 
salaried employees, and $159.2 million was due to hourly employees.81
At the time of Kmart’s chapter 11 filing, Sections 507(a)(3) and 507(a)(4) of the 
Bankruptcy Code required that the priority claims of  each employee would be limited to 
$4,650 in pre-petition wages and benefits.
 
82 Kmart estimated that 97% of its workforce met 
this category.83  However, Kmart did not provide more than an estimate, stating that “it is 
difficult for the Debtors to know the exact amount due each Employee for the pre-petition 
period.”84
To the degree that Kmart’s requests exceeded the statutory priority limits of the 
Bankruptcy Code, they still claimed that the payments were justified under section 
105.
 
85Kmart noted that “[n]umerous courts have used their section 105(a) powers under the
‘doctrine of necessity’ to authorize payment of a debtor-in-possession’s pre-petition 
80 Motion For Order (i) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Petition Wages, Salaries, and Employee Benefits; (ii) 
Authorizing 
the Debtors to Continue the Maintenance of Employee Benefit Programs in the Ordinary Course; and (iii)Directing All 
banks to Honor Pre-petition Checks for Payment of Pre-petition Employee Obligations, 7 (Filed Jan. 22, 2002).  
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 28. 
83 Id. at 9. 
84 Id. at 28.  This statement is confusing.  Kmart is asking for money to pay its employees, but then it is claiming that it  
doesn’t know exactly how much it needs to pay.  Once the court granted Kmart’s motion, it seems likely that Kmart 
calculated the exact amount necessary to pay each employee before cutting the check.  It is not clear why Kmart did 
not perform this analysis for the court.  Perhaps, Kmart just assumed that the motion would be summarily granted, and 
that any attempt to pinpoint exact numbers would be unnecessary.   
85 Id. at 30. 
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obligations where, as here, such payment is an essential element of the preservation of the 
debtor-in-possession’s potential for rehabilitation.”86
As with all of its first day motions, Kmart supported the motion to pay employee 
wages with an affidavit of Charles Conaway. Conaway’s testimony is detailed, and it directly 
states all of the facts alleged in the motion.
 
87
An order was entered by the court approving the motion on January 25, 2002.
 
88
2. Motion for the Payment of Expenses of Professionals
 
Another typical first day motion is a request to establish procedures for the interim 
payment of professionals. Although reading the code literally would suggest that 
professionals would wait until the end of the case – or at least for 120 day periods – to seek 
approval of and receive payment of their fees and reimbursable expenses, professionals are 
actually allowed to collect interim fees, generally subject to a retainage arrangement, like one 
used in construction contracts, during the course of the bankruptcy.89  As the lawyers in 
Kmart were likely to incur large amounts of fees and expenses and were unwilling to provide 
their services on credit, on the first day of the bankruptcy case they filed a motion requesting 
the permission to pay the professionals involved in the bankruptcy. The motion cited 
Section 331 of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows professionals to apply for relief every 120 
86 Id. at 31-32. 
87See, Affidavit and Statement of Charles C. Conaway in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Orders, 44 
(filed Jan. 22, 2002).  
88 Order (i) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Petition Wages, Salaries, and Employee Benefits; (ii) Authorizing the 
Debtors to Continue the Maintenance of Employee Benefit Programs in the Ordinary Course; and (iii)Directing All 
banks to Honor Pre-petition Checks for Payment of Pre-petition Employee Obligations (Filed Jan 25, 2002).  
89 Jonathan P. Friedland, Michael L. Bernstein, George W. Kuney, & John D. Ayer, Chapter 11 – 101, The Nuts and Bolts 
of Chapter 11 Practice: a primer, 246 (American Bankruptcy Institute, 2007).  
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days, or more often if the court permits.  Kmart requested monthly payment of all 
professionals. Under Kmart’s requested procedure, each professional would submit a 
detailed monthly statement of services rendered and expenses incurred. If there was no 
objection, Kmart would pay ninety-percent of the bill for fees with a ten percent holdback, 
and one hundred percent of disbursements for the month.  Kmart proposed that these 
payments would be “subject to the Court’s subsequent approval as part of the normal 
interim fee application process approximately every 120 days.90
As legal support for its motion, Kmart noted that “[s]imilar procedures for 
compensating and reimbursing court-approved professionals have been established in other 
large chapter 11 cases…. Such procedures are needed to avoid professionals funding the 
reorganization case.”  Of course, Kmart also cited the talismanic Section 105, although it did 
not explore its relation to this request in any detail.
 
91
The court entered an order approving this motion on January 25, 2002.
 
92
3. DIP Financing
 
Although the filing of the bankruptcy provided with some breathing room regarding 
pre-petition creditors, Kmart still needed to continue operations as usual if the 
reorganization was to succeed.  Unsurprisingly, Kmart did not have enough cash on hand to 
90 Order (i) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Petition Wages, Salaries, and Employee Benefits; (ii) Authorizing the 
Debtors to Continue the Maintenance of Employee Benefit Programs in the Ordinary Course; and (iii)Directing All 
banks to Honor Pre-petition Checks for Payment of Pre-petition Employee Obligations (Filed Jan 25, 2002).  
91 Motion for an Administrative Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 331 Establishing Procedures for Interim 
Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses of Professionals, 11 (Filed Jan 22, 2002).  It is likely that Kmart 
thought that this motion would be summarily granted and that extensive support was not necessary.  See footnote 55.   
92 Interim Order Authorizing PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Financial Advisors for the Debtors and Debtors in 
Possession (Entered Jan. 25, 2002).  
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fund the completion of the restructuring process.  Therefore, Kmart concluded that it was 
necessary to obtain a firm commitment for post-petition financing at the outset of its case.93
Kmart requested permission to obtain post-petition financing from JPMorgan Chase 
Bank and a syndicate of financial institutions (the “Post-petition Lenders”) up to the amount 
of $2 billion.  Under section 364(c)(1), Kmart moved to grant the Post-petition Lenders: (1) 
superpriority claim status; (2) perfected first priority liens on all unencumbered pre-petition 
and post-petition property; and (3) perfected junior security interests and liens on all pre-
petition and post-petition property subject to valid, perfected, and non-avoidable liens.
 
94
Kmart was not able to procure the required post-petition financing in the form of 
unsecured credit or unsecured debt with an administrative priority, primarily because of the 
large amount of funds required by Kmart during the course of the bankruptcy proceedings.
 
95
• JPM Chase Bank, Fleet Retail, CSFB and GCC committed to provide $500
million each;
  
Therefore, Kmart determined “in their sound business judgment” that the best option was 
the following: 
• Kmart agreed to pay the underwriting fees;
93 Affidavit and Statement of Charles C. Conaway in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Orders, filed Jan. 25
2002.
94 Motion for Interim and Final Order Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-petition Financing Pursuant to 11. U.S.C. § §
105, 361, 362, 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2) and 364(c)(3) Scheduling Final Hearing Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(c) (filed
Jan. 22, 2002). Kmart does not appear to support this statement with anything more than the affidavit of Conaway. See
Affidavit and Statement of Charles C. Conaway in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Orders, filed Jan. 25
2002.
95 Motion for Interim and Final Order Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-petition Financing Pursuant to 11. U.S.C. § §
105, 361, 362, 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2) and 364(c)(3) Scheduling Final Hearing Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(c) (filed
Jan. 22, 2002). Kmart does not appear to support this statement with anything more than the affidavit of Conaway. See
Affidavit and Statement of Charles C. Conaway in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Orders, filed Jan. 25
2002.
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• JPMorgan Chase and JPM Securities were entitled to change the structure,
terms pricing, or amount of the DIP Credit Facility; and
• Until each initial lender under the DIP Credit Facility was reduced by
assignment to no more than $250 million (or greater if satisfactory to the
lender), the aggregate usage of the DIP Credit Facility will be limited to $1. 75
billion.96
Kmart’s motion was granted on January 25, 2002.  In the order, the court 
incorporated the credit agreement as requested by Kmart.97 
96 Affidavit and Statement of Charles C. Conaway in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Orders, filed Jan. 25 
2002.  
97 Order Approving DIP Credit Agreement and Related Documents (Entered on the Docket Jan. 25, 2002). 
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Chapter Seven 
BEST FRIENDS: KMART’S CRITICAL VENDOR MOTION 
The hot, harsh sun beats down on the hundreds, perhaps thousands, waiting in the line snaked around a 
solitary well.   Those who are fortunate will receive a cupful or two of relief; others will get nothing. 
Suddenly, a small group of figures push their way to the front. 
“We’ll each take a gallon,” their leader says.  
“But that’s not fair.   There’s only so much to go around,” the well keeper replies. 
“We don’t care, We’re critical vendors.”98 
In this chapter, the motion to pay critical vendors will be examined in detail. 
Although Kmart’s motion to pay critical vendors was originally granted by the court, the 
bankruptcy court’s order was reversed on appeal by the district court.  To the surprise of 
many, the district court’s reversal was upheld on appeal to the Seventh Circuit. The details of 
the critical vendor motion are necessary to understand the importance of this reversal.  
A. The Bankruptcy Court Decision
As one of its twenty-five first day motions, Kmart Corporation requested 
authorization for payment of pre-petition claims of certain “critical” trade vendors.99  In the 
motion, Kmart requested the authorization to pay vendors that were “essential to the 
uninterrupted functioning of the Debtor’s business operations.”100  The vendors listed in the 
motion were the grocery vendor Fleming Companies, the music vendor Handleman 
98 Joseph Gilday, “Critical” Error: Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate the Bankruptcy Code, 11 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 
411, 413 (2003). 
99 Motion for Order Under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) Authorizing the Payment of Pre-petition Claims of Certain Critical 
Trade Vendors, 1 (Filed Jan 22, 2002). 
100 Id. at 7-8. 
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Company, egg and dairy vendors, and other vendors who supplied goods and services 
related to advertising. 101  All told, Kmart owed these vendors a total of $183.8 million.102
Table 1: “Critical” Vendors
 
103 
Vendor Relationship to Kmart Total Owed 
Fleming 
Fleming was a food 
distribution company that 
supplied substantially all of 
the food and consumable 
products in the Debtor’s 
stores. Food sales accounted 
for $4.2 billion, or 11%, of 
Kmart’s yearly sales.  
$76 Million 
Handleman 
Handleman was Kmart’s sole 
music vendor.  Music sales in 
Kmart accounted for $500 
million, or 1.5%, of Kmart’s 
yearly sales.  
$64 Million 
Egg and Dairy Vendors 
Kmart’s eggs and dairy were 
supplied by a network of 
small vendors.  Egg and dairy 
sales accounted for 
approximately $160 million, 
or 0.5%, of Kmart’s yearly 
sales.  
$6.8 Million 
Advertising 
Kmart depended upon many 
newspapers, ad production 
businesses, and commodity 
paper suppliers to supply 
weekly newspaper 
advertisements. Kmart 
estimated that advertising 
generated $11 billion, or 30% 
of their yearly sales.  
$37 Million 
101 Id. at 8. 
102 Id. at 9-11. 
103 Motion for Order Under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) Authorizing the Payment of Pre-petition Claims of Certain Critical 
Trade Vendors, 1 (Filed Jan 22, 2002). 
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What made the critical vendor motion extraordinary was the sweeping nature of its 
request for relief.  Kmart requested authority “to pay all, a portion [of,] or none of the 
Critical Vendor Claims as determined by Debtors in their sole discretion.”104  Kmart announced 
the intention to force the critical vendors to sign a trade agreement in exchange for the 
money, which would place limits on future claims and litigation.  But Kmart requested the 
authority to make the payments even if no trade agreement could be reached if, “in their 
business judgment, that failure to pay the Critical Vendor Claim is likely to result in 
irreparable harm to the Debtors’ business operations.”105
authority, in their discretion and without further order of the court, (a) to 
declare that any Trade Agreement between the Debtors and 
such Critical Vendor is terminated (if applicable), and (b) to 
declare that provisional payments made to Critical Vendors on 
account of Critical Vendor Claims be deemed to have been in 
payment of then-outstanding post-petition claims of such 
vendors without further order of the Court or action by any 
person or entity.
  Further, if the critical vendor 
declined to comply with the trade agreement, Kmart sought:  
106 
Further, if Kmart chose to terminate the trade agreement, they sought the authority to force 
the return of any payments made to the critical vendors.107
The authority cited by Kmart for their requests was Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, which provides that “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”
 
108  Kmart noted that 
104 Id. at 11 (emphasis added).    
105 Id. at 13. 
106 Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 
107 Id. 
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several courts had used this provision to justify the “‘necessity of payment’ doctrine to 
authorize payment of a debtor’s pre-petition obligations where, as here, such payment is 
necessary to effectuate the ‘paramount purpose’ of chapter 11 reorganization, which is to 
prevent the debtor from going in to liquidation and to preserve the debtor’s potential for 
rehabilitation.”109
However, Kmart’s motion to pay critical vendors was opposed by Capital Factors 
(“Capital”). Capital was a factoring agent, purchasing accounts receivable and assuming the 
collection responsibilities, for some of Kmart’s apparel suppliers. Capital held unsecured 
claims of about $20 million.  Capital was not listed as a “critical vendor” by Kmart, and so 
the payment of the “critical vendors” shrunk the amount of cash that would be available to 
satisfy Capital’s claims when it came time to do so under a confirmed plan of reorganization 
or otherwise.
 
110
Four days after the first day motion to allow payment to critical trade vendors, the 
bankruptcy judge signed an order granting the requested relief. Kmart was “authorized, but 
not directed, in the reasonable exercise of their business judgment, to pay all, a portion or 
none of the pre-petition claims” of the critical vendors.
 
111   Further, Kmart was given 
authorization to enter into trade agreements with the critical vendors in exchange for 
payment.112  However, if Kmart used “diligent efforts” to get the critical vendors to sign the 
109 Id. at 18. 
110 Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corporation, 291 Bankr.Rep. 818, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
111 Order Under U.S.C. § 105(a) Authorizing the Payment of Pre-petition Claims of Certain Critical Trade Vendors,2 
(Jan 26, 2002).
108 Id. at 17.
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trade agreements, they could pay the vendors without an agreement if the “failure to pay the 
Critical Vendor Claim is likely to result in irreparable harm to the Debtors’ business 
operations.”113
B. Critical Reservations?
  In sum, every major request Kmart presented in the motion was granted.  
Although the court did eventually overrule the objections of Capital, it expressed 
some reservations regarding Kmart’s motion: 
Motions to pay critical trade creditors always present difficult questions for 
courts.   We’re seeing more and more of them, and our problem is that we 
have to stretch to find some authority to do them. However, I, after hearing 
this testimony and reading the affidavit [of Charles C. Conaway, Kmart’s 
Chief Executive Officer], am convinced that Fleming, Handleman and the egg 
and dairy vendors…as well as the advertising concerns, are necessary to keep 
this business going as a going concern.114 
The reservations expressed by the court are significant for two related reasons.  First, the 
court’s order allowing the payment of critical vendors was eventually reversed. In particular, 
the order was reversed specifically because there was no legal support for the grant of the 
motion. Even the bankruptcy court recognized that the legal support for the motion was 
thin, and that it needed “to stretch” to find in favor of Kmart.  Second, the statement by the 
court exemplifies the attitude, so common among bankruptcy judges, to approve first day 
motions without deeply questioning their legal support, even when they know it is thin.115  
Perhaps the judge was afraid to question a debtor such as Kmart out of fear that other large 
companies would choose other forums if the courts of the Northern District of Illinois were 
112 Id. at 4. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. (citing App. to Appellee’s Brief). 
115 See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy From Olympus, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 977, (963) (2010). 
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viewed as hostile to critical vendor motions and other aggressive reorganization techniques 
that are accepted in jurisdictions that might be described as “accommodating.”  In any case, 
the Kmart judge appeared content to go along with the common practice of the time.   So 
long as there was a sufficient showing that the vendors listed by Kmart were “critical,” the 
court apparently felt that it was unnecessary to look beyond section 105(a) for legal support.  
When the bankruptcy court granted Kmart’s “critical vendor” orders, one 
commentator viewed it as just one decision among many confirming the practice.  In June 
2002, Bruce Nathan examined various decisions regarding critical vendors in “Critical 
Vendors: Elevating the Low-Priority Unsecured Claims of Pre-Petition Trade Creditors.”  
Nathan recognized that courts often allowed general unsecured claims to be given higher 
priority if the creditors were deemed to be “critical.”  As part of his analysis, he noted that 
Kmart obtained orders authorizing extensive payments to several “critical” vendors.  These 
payments were cited as part of a larger trend in which “low-priority, pre-petition general 
unsecured claims can be converted to higher-priority administrative claims arising from post-
petition credit sales to the debtor.”116
Later developments, such as the motion’s eventual reversal by the District Court, are 
examined in Chapter Nine.  
 
116 See Bruce S. Nathan, Critical Vendors: Elevating the Low-Priority Unsecured Claims of Pre-Petition Trade Creditors, 21 
Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 14, 14 (2002). However, the author did note that In re CoServeL.L.C., 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2002), held that a critical vendor payment (1) must be indispensable to the debtor’s business, (2) non-payment 
of the claim risks probable harm, and (3) there is no practical or legal alternative to payment of the claim.  Id. at 33. 
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Chapter Eight 
IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST 
There is only one class in the community that thinks more about money than the rich, and that is the poor. 
The poor can think of nothing else.  
Oscar Wilde 
After the flurry of first day motions, the parties in Kmart’s chapter 11 case created a 
veritable blizzard of filings.  One month into the bankruptcy, 937 items had been entered on 
to the docket (approximately 40 per day).  By six months, the docket grew to over 5000 
items, and after one year the docket totaled over 8000 documents.117
An examination of all of these documents is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, two topics are of particular importance.  First, this chapter examines Kmart’s 
treatment of unexpired pre-petition leases. Kmart used the bankruptcy code to shed 
unprofitable store operations.  Trimming excess costs was crucial to Kmart’s survival and 
eventual reorganization. Second, this chapter examines Kmart’s treatment of JDA Software. 
Companies are often granted administrative priority for post-petition claims under the 
theory that this will encourage them to cooperate with the debtor.  As JDA Software 
discovered, however, the grant of administrative priority is not automatic.  Even if a 
company provides post-petition services, a debtor may avoid granting priority to its unless 
the company can prove that its services benefited the estate.  
 
A. Unexpired Leases
Before filing for bankruptcy, Kmart was a party to about 2,000 real property leases, 
mostly for retail outlets. The day after filing for bankruptcy, Kmart filed a motion for 
117 Docket Report.  
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permission to reject approximately 365, or approximately 18%, of its unexpired pre-petition 
real estate leases.118  Even after the rejection of so many leases, the claims of landlords under 
the remaining, assumed leases comprised the largest claim against the estate. 119
As a support for its motion, Kmart made several claims.  First, Kmart claimed that 
“Debtors have determined that rejecting the Real Property Leases as of the Rejection Date 
for each Real Property Lease is in the best interests of the Debtors’ estates, creditors and 
other parties in interest.
 
120  Second, Kmart claimed that they, in conjunction with their real 
estate advisors, had evaluated the possibility of assigning the leases and determined that they 
do not have “any marketable value beneficial to the Debtors’ estates.”  Third, Kmart noted 
that the retention of the leases would involve the payment of real estate taxes, utilities, 
insurance and other related charges.  The payment of these expenses would not bring any 
benefit to the estate.  Fourth, Kmart noted that the costs associated with the leases were 
substantial and “constitute an unnecessary drain” on its resources.  Fifth, the savings 
resulting from rejecting the leases would favorably affect Kmart’s cash flow. Finally, “no 
person has expressed any interest in purchasing or taking an assignment of the Real Property 
Leases.”121 
118 Motion for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired 
Real Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases (filed Jan. 23, 2002).  
119 See chart on page 65.  
120 Kmart does not appear to support this claim with any hard facts or financial analysis.  As well, they note that they 
are not finished with their review and evaluation of the unexpired leases.   
121 Motion for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired 
Real Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases (filed Jan. 23, 2002 
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As with other motions filed during the first days of bankruptcy, the factual support 
proposed for the motion was in the form of an affidavit of Conaway.122  The wording of the 
motion largely tracked the language of Conaway’s affidavit, or visa-versa.123
Through the motion, Kmart sought two types of relief.  First, Kmart sought the 
ability to reject outright certain leases, which they listed on Schedule A.  Second, Kmart 
sought permission to reject some or all of the leases on Schedule B, and they specifically 
sought permission to retain some of the leases on Schedule B without seeking further 
permission from the bankruptcy court. 
 
124
Sections 105 and 365(a) were proposed by Kmart as the legal support for the motion. 
Kmart noted that: (1) generally the assumption or rejection of leases was subject to review 
under the business judgment standard, (2) this standard is satisfied if the debtor determines 
the action will benefit the estate, and (3) that courts show great deference to a debtor’s 
decision to reject. Further, Kmart noted that the lessors would have ample opportunity to 
object to this motion, so they would not be prejudiced.
 
125
A few days later, the court granted all of Kmart’s requests.
 
126  Although several 
leasees objected to Kmart’s motion, their objections were overruled. 127   A Notice of 
122 Motion for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired Real 
Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases (filed Jan. 23, 2002 
123 Affidavit and statement of Charles C. Conaway in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Orders, 93 (filed 
Jan. 25, 2002).  
124 Motion for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired Real 
Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases (filed Jan. 23, 2002 
125 Motion for an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired Real 
Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases (filed Jan. 23, 2002 
126 Order Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired Real Property Leases 
and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases (filed Jan. 25, 2002).
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Rejection to be sent to the affected lessors, a copy of which was filed with Kmart’s original 
motion, was filed on February 19, 2002.128
B. JDA Software, Post-petition Services, and Administrative Priority
 
This section will be divided into two parts.  First, Kmart’s use of section 503(b) 
throughout its bankruptcy work is briefly summarized to show how the court granted 
administrative priority to companies performing post-petition work.  Second, JDA’s failed 
request for administrative priority is examined in detail.  
i. Kmart’s General Use of Section 503(b)
Section 503(b) of the bankruptcy code deals with the “allowance of administrative 
expenses.”  In particular, section 503(b) provides that “the actual, necessary costs and 
expenses of preserving the estate” are to be treated as an administrative expense.  The 
statute specifically lists “wages, salaries, and commissions,” but it does not specify any other 
form of expenses.129  However, cases have held that any post-petition expenses incurred by 
the estate will qualify if they are necessary and benefit the estate. This is true even if the 
expenses do not benefit creditors. 130   The court is not permitted approve a plan of 
reorganization that does not provide for the payment of administrative expenses, unless the 
holder of the claim agrees otherwise.131 
127 See, for example, Order Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired Real 
Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases, Bank of New York (filed Feb. 
15, 2002) and Order Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 365(a) Authorizing (A) Rejection of Certain Unexpired Real 
Property Leases and (B) Approving Procedures for Rejecting Other Unexpired Leases, Menard Inc. (filed Feb. 15, 
2002).  
128 Notice of Rejection (filed Feb. 19, 2002). 
129 See 11 U.S.C. 503(b).   
130 See Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968);In re Klein Sleep Products, Inc., 78 F.3d 18 (2d.Cir. 1996). 
131 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A).   
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Throughout the course of the bankruptcy, Kmart was granted permission to treat the 
claims of many post-petition vendors as administrative claims. For instance, these claims 
covered such items as purchase orders issued pre-petition but satisfied post-petition by the 
delivery of goods and services;132post-petition obligations relating to license bonds issued by 
Hartford; 133 and expenses incurred by Kmart stores that were closed down during 
bankruptcy. 134
i. JDA Software’s Post-petition Claims
 
As JDA Software (“JDA”) discovered, however, Section 503(b) does not provide a 
blanket protection to vendors who perform post-petition services to the debtor. Rather, the 
services performed must result in a real benefit to the debtor.  For the purposes of Section 
503(b), potential or future benefits are not sufficient to provide administrative priority.  
a. JDA’s Pre-Petition Work for Kmart
Kmart began a business relationship with JDA on June 22, 2001, exactly seven 
months before Kmart declared bankruptcy.  Under the contracts signed by Kmart, JDA 
agreed to make modifications to software for Kmart’s “Caribbean Project” (“Services 
Agreement”). 135As well, JDA agreed to provide “telephone and e-mail support, updates, and 
program temporary fixes” starting March 1, 2002 (“Support Agreement”). On the day that 
132 ORDER in accordance with section 503[b][1][A] of Bankruptcy Code, the Debtors are authorized to treat purchase 
orders issued pre-petition but satisfied post-petition by the delivery of goods, merchandise or other services as post-
petition administrative expenses (filed 2/13/2002). 
133 STIPULATION AND ORDER to lift stay to terminate certain surety bond's of Hartford  (filed 3/6/2002).  
134 Among many others, see Agreed Order Resolving Lease Rejection and Administrative Claims for Kmart Store No 
9453 (Signed on Oct. 26, 2004).   
135 In this project, Kmart planned on opening a store in Trinidad “and subsequent stores of an unspecified number in 
the Caribbean region.”   
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Kmart filed bankruptcy, JDA was owed in excess of $1. 2 million for services rendered to 
Kmart. However, JDA had not completed all the services originally requested by Kmart. 136
b. JDA’s Post-Petition Work for Kmart
 
Soon after Kmart filed for bankruptcy, representatives of the company reassured 
JDA that it would be paid in full for all post-petition work. Eric Haskel, the international 
CFO of Kmart, and Steven Hunter, the Divisional Vice President of Kmart’s Information 
Systems Application Department, “represented that Kmart would ensure that JDA ‘be made 
whole’ for all services rendered by JDA prior to the Filing Date. ” As well, Haskel promised 
that Kmart would pay for all post-Bankruptcy Filing services rendered by JDA within thirty 
30 days of invoice “even if I have to write the check myself.”137
Armed with a promise from the international CFO,
 
138 JDA continued to provide 
work with Kmart under the terms of the Services Agreement under on a “time and materials 
basis.”  It appears that all work completed performed by JDA was satisfactory, and one 
Kmart employee noted that JDA’s “team was the first to not only bring a solid 
understanding of the system process, but an even better understanding of the business 
environment.”139  Eventually, JDA provided a total of $291,597.07 of post-petition services 
to Kmart.140 
136 Stipulation of Agreed Facts With Respect to Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed Feb. 
10, 2003).  
137 Motion for Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed July 30, 2002). 
138 The significance of Haskel’s statement is downplayed in the Stipulation of Agreed Facts: “JDA representatives were 
told by at least one Kmart representative that work performed post-petition would be compensated as an administrative 
expense under Section 503.”  See Stipulation of Agreed Facts With Respect to Administrative Expense Claim Filed by 
JDA Software, Inc. (Filed Feb. 10, 2003).  
139 Motion for Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed July 30, 2002). 
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At the beginning of February, JDA requested payment for the work it had completed 
since the petition date.141  A few days later, Kmart informed JDA that “the opening of a 
Caribbean store was being delayed, and, as a result, JDA’s services were no longer 
needed.”142  JDA moved for all of its post-petition work to be recognized as administrative 
expenses.143
c. Law Regarding Administrative Expenses in the Seventh
Circuit
 
In the Seventh Circuit, courts have provided priority treatment for administrative 
expenses under section 503 “to encourage creditors to deal with the debtor in possession 
and thereby support the reorganization effort.”  Section 503(b) states in part that “[a]fter 
notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses…including, - the actual, 
necessary costs of preserving the estate.”  In granting administrative priority to claims under 
section 503, the Seventh Circuit uses the two-pronged Jartran test. First, the claims must arise 
“out of a transaction with the debtor in possession.” Second, the transaction must be 
“beneficial to the operation of the debtor in possession’s business.”144
d. JDA’s Argues That It Provided a Benefit to Kmart
  
JDA argued that the post-petition services that it provided to Kmart were beneficial. 
First, they noted the fact that the international CFO specifically promised that the services 
140 Stipulation of Agreed Facts With Respect to Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed Feb. 
10, 2003).  
141 Motion for Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed July 30, 2002). 
142 Stipulation of Agreed Facts With Respect to Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed Feb. 
10, 2003).  
143 Motion for Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed July 30, 2002). 
144 In re Kmart, 293 B.R. 905, 909 (2003). 
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would be treated as administrative expenses.  In reliance upon this promise, “JDA personnel 
attended numerous meetings, provided status reports and other consulting functions all in 
furtherance of the Caribbean Project and benefiting the Debtor’s business as a whole.”145    
In particular, JDA focused on the fact that Kmart requested the post-petition services.  JDA 
warned that if their claims were not granted administrative status, the result “would allow the 
debtor to require performance under its executor contracts while it considers its options, as 
Kmart did, and then decide after the fact whether it wants to pay for those services.  Such a 
result is wholly inequitable and inconsistent with the policies underlying the Bankruptcy 
Code. . . . ”  Further, the entire purpose of 503 would be frustrated, as vendors would refuse 
to do business under circumstances that might result in unpaid or underpaid claims.146
e. Kmart Argues That It Was Not Provided With a Benefit
 
Kmart admitted that JDA’s claims arose out of a transaction with Kmart, but argued 
that Kmart was not provided with any benefit from JDA’s work.  Specifically, Kmart noted 
that the use of the words “necessary and “actual” in section 503(b) were held by the Seventh 
Circuit to exclude merely potential benefits and to ensure that the estate is actually 
benefitted.  Although the software developed by JDA might have been partially delivered to 
Kmart, Kmart never used any of the software developed by JDA and deleted all copies of 
the software from its computers. As well, Kmart noted that JDA could not prove that 
Kmart had ever used the software.  
145 Motion for Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed July 30, 2002). 
146 Response of JDA Software, Inc. To Debtors’ Motion for Summary Judgment With Incorporated Memorandum 
of Law Against the Motion for Administrative Expense Claim Filed by JDA Software, Inc. (Filed Feb. 24 2003).  
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f. The Bankruptcy Court Rules in Favor of Kmart
The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Kmart.  The court found that JDA collapsed 
the two-pronged test Jartran test and essentially ignored the “benefit” prong. Although JDA 
admittedly was induced by Kmart to continue work post-petition, this merely confirms that 
JDA entered into a transaction with Kmart.  “Whether the estate benefitted from such a 
transaction, however, is a separate inquiry altogether, and one engaged in only after 
concluding that the creditor entered into a transaction with the debtor in possession.  Put 
another way, post-petition performance alone does not automatically translate into a benefit 
to the estate, even if there was inducement on the part of the debtor.”  The mere presence 
of a potential benefit is too speculative to count as an “actual” or “necessary” cost of the 
estate under 503(b).  
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Chapter Nine 
SOMETIMES A PARENT HAS TO SAY NO 
Next to doing the right thing, the most important thing is to let people know you are doing the right thing. 
John D. Rockefeller  
On April 10, 2003, about one month before Kmart was scheduled to exit bankruptcy, 
District Judge Grady heard oral argument an appeal on Kmart’s critical vendor motion. 
The appellant was Capital Factors - a vendor who had unsuccessfully requested status as a 
“critical vendor.”  Judge Grady reversed the order authorizing payment of the critical 
vendors and concluded that neither § 105(a) nor a “doctrine of necessity” supported the 
orders.”147
A. Bankruptcy Court Decision
  This chapter will examine the district court’s decision and briefly review the 
critical commentary written soon after the decision.  
The central issue raised by Capital Factors was “whether there was a sufficient 
evidentiary basis for the bankruptcy court to allow payment of [the critical vendor] 
claims.”148  As noted above, § 105 allows a court to “issue any order, process, or judgment 
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions” of the bankruptcy code. 149  
Although Kmart did not specifically refer to the “doctrine of necessity,” the court found that 
its claim that the payments were “necessary,” “integral” and had a “good business 
justification” made it apparent that Kmart had relied upon the doctrine. Further, if the 
147 Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart. Corp., 291 Bankr. Rep. 818, 825 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
148 Id. at 821. 
149 11. U.S.C. § 105(a).  
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“doctrine of necessity” was not codified in the bankruptcy rules, it must be applied via § 
105.150
Significantly, precedent from the Seventh Circuit stated that § 105 only allowed a 
court to “enforce the provisions of the Code, not to add on to the Code” as sees fit. 
Further, the Code does not provide priority “based on the ‘critical’ or ‘integral’ status of a 
creditor.”  Therefore, the bankruptcy court in Kmart “altered the priority scheme set forth in 
the Bankruptcy Code.”
 
151
ignore the Bankruptcy code’s statutory scheme of priority in favor of “equity,” 
especially in light of the Seventh Circuit’s admonition that “[t]he fact that a 
[bankruptcy] proceeding is equitable does not give the judge a free-floating 
discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his personal views of 
justice and fairness, however enlightened those views may be. ”
  Although the district court acknowledged that there was a split 
among the courts regarding the proper application of § 105, the district court could not: 
152
As well, although the “doctrine of necessity was “well-intended” and even 
“beneficial,” its application in this case simply was not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code. 
“Congress has not elected to codify the doctrine of necessity or otherwise permit pre-plan 
payment of pre-petition unsecured claims.”  Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not have 
either the statutory or the equitable power to “authorize the pre-plan payment of pre-
petition unsecured claims.”
 
153   As a consequence, the “critical vendor” orders were 
reversed.154
150Id. at 822. 
 
151Id. 
152Id. 
153Id. at 823. 
154Id. at 825. 
54 
B. Critical Commentary
The reversal of the bankruptcy court was immediately recognized as an important 
and potentially influential decision.   In 2003, two members of Skadden, Arps, Slate Meagher 
& Flom155 published a paper entitled “First Day Motions and Orders in Large Chapter 11 
Cases: (Critical Vendor, Dip Financing and Cash Management Issues).”156  The paper noted 
that motions to pay pre-petition claims of critical vendors were commonly justified when 
vendors might refuse to cooperate with the company’s reorganizational efforts and when the 
vendor is particularly essential to the operations of the business.  However, the authors 
recognized that the traditional views of critical vendors were rejected by the district court in 
Kmart. The paper predicted several possible effects of the Kmart decision.  First, the authors 
posited that the decision may work to the benefit of debtors as they will no longer be 
inundated with requests from vendors to be placed on the “critical vendor list.”  Second, the 
decision may call into doubt many traditional first day motions justified by the doctrine of 
necessity such as the payment of pre-petition wages and salaries. 157
Andrew Currie and Sean McCann also noted the potentially wide ranging effect of 
the Kmart reversal.   Before Kmart, courts “typically” allowed payments to critical vendors. 
However, they stated that the reversal of critical vendor payments raised “serious concerns 
about the continued viability of the doctrine of necessity.”  They predicted several changes if 
the decision was upheld by the Seventh Circuit.  First, venue choices would be influenced as 
 
155 SkaddenArps represented Kmart in the bankruptcy.  
156 See Jay M. Goffman& Grenville R. Day, First Day Motions and Orders in Large Chapter 11 Cases: (Critical Vendor, Dip 
Financing and Cash Management Issues), 12 J. Bankr. L &Prac.59, 69-70, 73-75 ((2003). 
157 See Jay M. Goffman& Grenville R. Day, First Day Motions and Orders in Large Chapter 11 Cases: (Critical Vendor, Dip 
Financing and Cash Management Issues), 12 J. Bankr. L &Prac.59, 69-70, 73-75 ((2003). 
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payments to critical vendors would no longer be available in the Seventh Circuit.  Second, 
other circuits might elect to follow the Seventh Circuit’s example, which would erode the 
confidence with which debtors typically approach first day motions.  Third, vendors that 
would typically have been critical would now be treated like every other creditor.  Fourth, 
the decision would likely slow down the trend of permitting the estate to make substantial 
payments in the first few days of the case, before most creditors were up to speed, and prior 
to the formation of the creditors’ committee.158
Thomas J.  Salerno
 
159  noted that critical vendor motions had become “standard 
procedure,” so much so that “most firms that do a substantial amount of debtor work have 
emergency motions (along with accompanying affidavits) on their word processors, ready to 
go.”  Salerno offered several criticisms of Kmart’s handling of the appeal.  First, in the 
context of Kmart, Critical Factor’s claim of $20 million was small.  Kmart should have 
settled with Critical Factor before an appeal became necessary. In essence, Salerno was 
asserting that Kmart and Skadden, Arps should have engineered matters so that the critical 
vendor motion evaded review by an Article III District Court that might take a less 
expansive view of a bankruptcy court’s section 105 powers than had the Kmart bankruptcy 
court. Second, several legal grounds could have been asserted by Kmart to support the 
critical vendor motion, but they were not.  Most notably, Salerno speculated that the 
bankruptcy court may have been able to base its grant of critical vendor status upon the 
158 See Andrew J. Currie & Sean McCann, Hold on to Those Payments, Critical Vendors: Capital Factors v. Kmart, 22 Am. 
Bankr. 
Inst. J. 1 (Jun. 2003). 
159 It should be noted that Salerno is presenting the case strictly from the perspective of debtor’s counsel.  For instance, 
the paper begins “Who would have thunk it?  Just when practitioners get bankruptcy judges properly trained, some 
appellate court steps in and messes it all up.”  Thomas J. Salerno, “The Mouse that Roared” Or “Hell Hath no Fury Like a 
Critical Vendor Scorned,”  22 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 28, 28 (Jun. 2003). 
56 
requirement that the vendors agreed to extend post-petition, debtor-in-possession financing 
pursuant to Code § 364(b). Finally, Salerno noted that one of the effects of the decision 
might include Chicago’s loss of “its recently acquired, coveted place as the haven for big 
cases.”160 
160 Thomas J. Salerno, “The Mouse that Roared” Or “Hell Hath no Fury Like a Critical Vendor Scorned,” 22 Am. Bankr. Inst. 
J. 28 (Jun. 2003).   
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Chapter Ten 
ALONG COMES A SPIDER 
The way to become rich is to put all your eggs in one basket and then watch that basket. 
Andrew Carnegie 
In the months after Kmart filed for bankruptcy, the stock of the company 
plummeted.  Some commentators even expressed doubt as to whether Kmart would be able 
to emerge from bankruptcy at all.161
A. Evaluating the financials
  In the best case scenario, Kmart’s creditors would be 
forced to wait a long time before they got any money, and the amount that they would 
receive was uncertain.  In this time of uncertainty, ESL saw an extraordinary financial 
opportunity.   
As noted in Chapter 4, ESL is a “vulture” hedge fund that specialized in buying up 
distressed companies.162  By 2002, ESL’s CEO, Edward Lampert, already owned some of 
Kmart’s debt, and in the months following Kmart’s bankruptcy he began to examine the 
possibility of buying even larger amounts of Kmart’s defaulted bonds.163  The risks were 
great as the financials of Kmart were in shambles.164 
161 Sherri Day, Kmart Faces Hurdle on Plan To Exit Bankruptcy Soon, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2003. 
162 A vulture fund is a private equity or hedge fund that invests in debt issued by an entity that is considered to be 
very weak or dying, or whose debt is in imminent default. 
163 Amounts are uncertain because the debt market is private. 
164 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at App. D , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL) 
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Consolidated Balance Sheets in millions of $ 2001 2000 
TOTAL ASSETS: 1, 245 401 
Cash and cash equivalents 5, 796 6, 350 
Merchandise inventories 800 925 
Total current assets 7, 841 7, 676 
Property and equipment, net 6, 093 6, 522 
Other assets and deferred charges 249 617 
Total assets 14, 183 14, 815 
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TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY: 
Long-term debt due within one year 0 68 
Accounts payable 89 2, 190 
Accrued payroll and other liabilities 420 1, 691 
Taxes other than income taxes 143 187 
Total current liabilities 652 4, 136 
Long-term debt and notes payable 330 2, 084 
Capital lease obligations 857 943 
Other long-term liabilities 132 883 
Total liabilities not subject to compromise 1, 971 8, 046 
Liabilities subject to compromise 8, 093 0 
Company obligated mandatorily redeemable convertible 889 887 
Common stock- share outstanding: 494 million-2001: 506 503 487 
Capital in excess of par value 1, 695 1, 578 
Retained earnings 1, 032 3, 817 
Total liabilities and equity 14, 183 14, 815 
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Data as of January 20, 2002 and January 31, 2001. As of fiscal year 2001, Kmart had a net 
operating loss (NOL) carry forward of $369 million and total deferred assets of $1,369 
million. By Fiscal year end 2002, these amounts had increased to $1,143 million and $2,466 
million, respectively. In both years, Kmart recovered a full valuation allowance against these 
assets to reflect the uncertainty of its future earnings. 
An intriguing question is what did ESL see that no other investor saw in Kmart’s financials?  
Even with a new management team, there was no guarantee that Kmart could find a way to 
competein a market dominated by Wal-Mart and Target.   
If anything, Kmart was losing ground on its two largest competitors.  However, 
Lampert identified Kmart’s one indisputable asset: below-market leases.  ESL believed that 
even if Kmart itself could not be salvaged, the company would still be valuable in liquidation 
because of its real estate holdings.165  Although Kmart owned some of its big-box retail 
locations, most of the stores were on long-term leases.  At the time of bankruptcy, these 
165 David Stowell, An Introduction to Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity: The New Paradigm 478 
(Kellogg School of Management ed., Academic Press 2010). 
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leases were considerably below market rate, and they would be valuable even in the event 
that Kmart had to sell leases to other business.166
B. Taking the plunge
  Officially, ESL stated that it intended to 
maintain Kmart as a retailer and that the company would be profitable by 2007.  
Once Lampert determined that Kmart was worth the investment, his company 
moved swiftly to become Kmart’s majority creditor.  During the spring of 2002, ESL began 
quietly accumulating Kmart’s defaulted bonds. 167 By the summer of 2002, ESL had 
accumulated more than $1 billion of the company’s defaulted debt.168
It did not take long for Lampert to begin asserting his newfound influence over 
Kmart’s bankruptcy.  In particular, Lampert wanted to speed up the bankruptcy process.
  By September 2002, 
ESL had a voice in the restructuring project through a seat on the financial institutions 
committee. 
169  
In early November of 2002, Lampert met with Kmart’s Chairman and CEO, Jim Adamson, 
to emphasize the importance of Kmart’s early emergence from bankruptcy.  Lampert 
pressed Mr. Adamson to file a plan of reorganization by Thanksgiving. 170   When the 
166 When Wall Street analysts implied that Lampert only wanted to take control of Kmart merely in order to sell the 
leases, he responded that “no retailer should aspire to have its real estate be worth more than its operating business.”  Of 
course, Lampert never claimed to be a retailer.   
167 Trading in distressed debt often occurs through private, unpublished transactions, so the exact timing and size of 
Lampert’s trades are unknown. 
168 Although it is hard to pinpoint dates, the amount is consistent with a timeline created by UBS investment bank. 
169 On July 24, 2002, the Bankruptcy Court extended the Debtors’ exclusive period through February 28, 2003 and the 
solicitation period to April 22, 2003. Because the Debtors’ required more time still, the court entered an order on 
February 25, 2003 that extended the filing period and solicitation period to June 30, 2003 and August 31, 2003, 
respectively. 
170 ESL lacked experience both in bankruptcy proceedings and in the running of businesses with the majority-control of 
a company’s stock. 
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company did not meet this deadline, Lampert’s attorney successfully demanded Adamson’s 
resignation.171
C. Proposing a plan
  Julian Day was appointed the new CEO of Kmart in January 2003, and the 
process of reorganization began moving at a rapid pace.  
Throughout early 2003, ESL continued to buy Kmart debt in private negotiated 
transactions.172  Kmart’s creditors, both banks and bond investors, made it clear to ESL that 
they would prefer to end their involvement with Kmart rather than taking stock in the New 
Holding Company.173 
171 David Stowell, An Introduction to Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity: The New Paradigm 
478 (Kellogg School of Management ed., Academic Press 2010). 
172 The amount acquired during this time is unknown. 
173 They probably believed Kmart could not be a viable company for the reasons mentioned in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter Eleven 
CRACKING THE BANK 
The ladder of success is best climbed by stepping on the rungs of opportunity. 
Ayn Rand 
Because of the complexity of the plan, only selected individual issues will be 
addressed in the proceeding five chapters.  The discussion will begin with the financial 
condition of Kmart followed by the class structure under the plan.  An analysis of Kmart’s 
business reasons will be addressed followed by a liquidity analysis.  Finally, what occurred on 
the Effective Date will be analyzed.174
The previous chapter analyzed the reasons why ESL believed that Kmart was worth 
the risk of investing in based on its current and historic financial statements.  This chapter 
analyzes the value of Kmart to determine how much that investment should be.
 
175  The 
174 The following chapters are based on the Disclosure Statement.  The Disclosure Statement contains Kmart’s history, 
business properties and operations, projections for those operations, risk factors associated with the business, a plan, a 
summary and analysis of the plan, and the financial statements related to the plan.  Under section 1125(b) of the 
bankruptcy code, a vote to accept or reject the plan cannot be solicited from a claimholder or interest holder unless a 
Disclosure Statement has been approved by the bankruptcy court as containing the necessary adequate 
information.Adequate information is defined in 11 U.S.C. 1125(a) as: (1)information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, 
as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor’s books 
and records, including a discussion of the potential material Federal tax consequences of the plan to the debtor, any 
successor to the debtor, and a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims or interests in the case, that would 
enable such a hypothetical investor of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan, but adequate 
information need not include such information about any other possible or proposed plan and in determining whether a 
disclosure statement provides adequate information, the court shall consider the complexity of the case, the benefit of 
additional information to creditors and other parties in interest, and the cost of providing additional information; and (2) 
“investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the relevant class” means investor having— (A) a claim or interest of 
the relevant class; (B) such a relationship with the debtor as the holders of other claims or interests of such class 
generally have; and (C) such ability to obtain such information from sources other than the disclosure required by this 
section as holders of claims or interests in such class generally have. 
175 Based on economic and market conditions as they existed and could be evaluated as of January 13, 2003. 
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Financial Advisors for the purposes of the Plan, estimated that the value of the reorganized 
Kmartin a hypothetical Chapter 11 reorganization, was between $2,250 million to $3,000 
million.  The equity valueof reorganized Kmart was estimated to range from $753 million to 
$1,503 million.176
Valuation Data ($ in millions except per-share data) 
 
Low Median High 
Aggregate firm value $2, 250 $2, 625 $3, 000 
Aggregate equity value $753 $1, 128 $1, 503 
Shares outstanding 86.24 86.24 86.24 
Equity value per share $8.74 $13.08 $17.43 
In arriving at the reorganized Kmart value, the Financial Advisors performed three 
types of analysis.   
First, Kmart was analyzed according to a comparable public company analysis.Under 
this analysis, a subject company is valued by comparing it to publically held companies in 
176 In arriving at these estimates, the Financial Advisors relied on a series of projections regarding the future 
performance of Kmart, performance of the industry, and general business and economic conditions beyond the control 
of Kmart including: (1) Net Sales for 2003 as compared to 2002 were projected to decrease by 17.5% due to the closure 
of 283 stores.  Net sales were expected to increase .7% in 2004, 5.3% in 2005, 5.5% in 2006 and 5.9% in 2007, (2) gross 
margins from 18% in 21.5% in 2007 because of improved promotional productivity, favorable product mix and marked 
improvement due to increased import purchases, (3) administrative expenses to remain at 20% from 2002 and 2003 as 
lower depreciation expense generated by fresh start accounting adjustments is offset by the effects of store closings and 
the resulting lower sales base (4) income taxes will be substantially offset by its unused net loss carry forwards against 
Kmart’s cancellation of debt income on the effective date. 
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reasonably similar lines of business.177
Second, Kmart was analyzed through the discounted cash flow method.  The 
discounted cash flow method related the value of Kmart to the present value of any 
expected future cash flows to be generated by Kmart. The discounted cash flow method is a 
forward-looking approach that discounts the expected future cash flows by a theoretical or 
observed discount rate.  For purposes of the valuation analysis, a discount rate between 20% 
and 25% was used.
The analytical work performed includes a comparing 
the enterprise value (market value of equity plus debt and minus excess cash) of Kmart to 
similar companies. 
178
Third, Kmart was analyzed through a comparable acquisition analysis.The 
comparable acquisition analysis entails calculating multiples of revenues, earnings and book 
value based on prices paid (including debt assumed and equity purchased) in announced 
mergers and acquisitions involving companies similar to Kmart. These multiples were then 
applied, to the projected financials of Kmart to determine an implied range of enterprise and 
equity values.The financial advisors (1) reviewed certain historical financial information of 
Kmart for recent years and interim periods, (2) reviewed the projections and the 
assumptions underlying them, (3) reviewed certain internal financial and operating data of 
Kmart, (4) met with certain members of management to discuss Kmart’s operations and 
future projects (including the operational changes contemplated by the business plan, (5) 
 
177 The comparable public companies were chosen based on their similarity to the subject company’s business, presence 
in the market and size. The price that an inventor is willing to pay in the public market for each company’s publicly 
traded securities represents that company’s current and future prospects as well as the rate of return required on 
investment.  
178 This analysis reflected a number factors including: (1) business execution risk; (2) the nature and derivation of the 
projections set forth in the Business Plan; and (3) the cost of equity for comparable companies.  
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reviewed publicly available financial data and (6) considered certain economic and industry 
information relevant to Kmart’s operating business and conducted such other analysis as the 
Financial Advisors deemed appropriate.179 
179 The Financial Advisors did not make an independent valuation or appraisal of the assets or liabilities of Kmart, and 
no such independent valuation or appraisal was provided to the Financial Advisors in connection with the valuation 
analysis.  
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Chapter Twelve 
A TIME TO STAND: KMART PROPOSES A PLAN 
Defeat is not the worst of failures. Not to have tried is the true failure. 
George Edward Woodberry 
The purpose of a Chapter 11 plan is to allow the debtor to exit Chapter 11. 
Lingering in Chapter 11 erodes the confidence of vendors in Kmart, creates enormous stress 
in employees personal lives, diminishes the financial condition of the company, and dims the 
prospect for a successful reorganization.  The terms of the plan are based primarily on the 
company’s ability to realize the goals of its business plan, and extensive negotiations with 
creditors.  However, a central tenant of the Bankruptcy Code is equality of distribution 
among similarly situated creditors which means classes have to be created fairly and creditors 
are due their fair share.  
Pursuant to section 1122 of the bankruptcy code, the plan contained five types of 
unclassified claims, Administrative claims180, Priority Tax claims181, PBGC claims, Workers’ 
Compensation claims, and Consignment claims.  In addition, the plan classified claims and 
interests into twelve classes into which creditor claims will be funneled into to determine 
how much money they would receive.182  According to the plan, it was anticipated that all of 
180 An administrative claim is a claim for payment of an administrative expense of a kind specified in §503(b) 
of the bankruptcy code and entitled to priority pursuant to §507(a)(1) of the bankruptcy code. 
181 Priority tax claims will be entitled to full satisfaction. The debtors estimate that priority tax lien will total $190 
million. 
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the unclassified claims would be paid in full; however the classified claims would be paid 
only a percentage described in Appendix A.183
Of the total claims asserted against the Debtors only about 14% will be paid.  This below 
graphic illustrates the amount distributed. 
 
The dark blue part shows the actual amount of money of the total paid to creditors.  The 
amount paid out is not divided evenly among the classes.  The graphic below illustrates how 
payments are made among the classes that receive payment under the plan. 
182 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 78 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL) 
183 Appendix A 
Amount distributed
Amount Undistributed 
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The distributions reflect extensive negotiations among the entities involved in the 
case based on their respective positions. 
Class 1 : Secured claims
Class 3: Prepetition claims
Class 4: Prepetion note claims
Class 5: Trade Vendor/ Lease 
rejection claims
Class 6: Other unsecured claims
Class 7: General unsecured 
convenience claims
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Chapter Thirteen 
A NEW WAY FORWARD: THE BUSINESS PLAN 
A good plan is like a road map: it shows the final destination and usually the best way to get there. 
Stanley Judd 
As part of its plan of reorganization, Kmart proposed an analysis of how it planned 
to achieve success in the future.   First, Kmart proposed to change store policies to save 
meet customer expectations and keep expenses down.   Second, Kmart outlined its market 
strategy for the next five years.     
A. Better Store Policies
The primary strategy of the Debtors for a successful reorganization is to “rationalize” 
and “optimize” the company’s store and lease portfolio.184  Kmart plans to reduce its stores 
by 600 to 1,514.  The stores that will be closed will be based on historical and projected 
operating results, current and future competition, real estate value, store age, size, capital 
spending requirements and other similar factors.185
Only a month before Kmart planned to exit bankruptcy, their overall strategic 
position remained unclear.  ''They haven't articulated a strategy,'' said Walter K. Levy, the 
managing director for retail trends and positioning at Kurt Salmon Associates.  “All they've 
done is have a series of tactics.  They still haven't defined why the customer should shop 
 
184 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 61, In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL) 
(Bankr. N.D.IL) 
185 Id. 
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there rather than Wal-Mart or Target. That really is the bottom line.''  The company also was 
criticized for hiring inexperienced chief merchandising and chief store operations officers.  
''That's one of the reasons their same-store sales continue to trend downward,'' said Burt 
Flickinger III, a managing partner of the Strategic Resource Group.  ''Target and Wal-Mart 
have at least stabilized during this recession.''186
Kmart’s response to these complaints in the media were less than persuasive.  Kmart 
declared it will continue with its promotional campaign and rely on the exclusive brands that 
were unable to keep it afloat prior to the Petition Date.
 
187
Before entering bankruptcy, Kmart worked for years to improve inventory control.      
There was little reason to assume that Kmart would develop a successful supply chain 
managementwhen there was still not a CIO
  Kmart claimed the difference it 
will successful now because it has (1) improved inventory control, (2) better store 
appearances, (3) a new “top seller” program, (4) “store of the future” campaign, and; (5) a 
better marketing plan.  
188 and the turnover at that position had been 
constant for the past six years.  Additionally, the development of a system is expensive and 
Kmart simply could not afford to implement a program.189  Finally, even if Kmart was able 
to revamp its inventory control, it would still be starting far behind Target and Wal-Mart.190 
186 Sherri Day, Kmart Faces Hurdle on Plan To Exit Bankruptcy Soon, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2003. 
187 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 62 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL) 
188 Chief information officer 
189 Steve Konicki,Now In Bankruptcy, Kmart Struggled With Supply Chain, Information Week, Jan. 28, 2002, at 13. 
190 Id. 
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As well, improving store appearance was a goal for Kmart even in the 1980’s.  Kmart 
planned to become a smaller “store of the neighborhood” with more local control; test a 
“store of the future” with wider aisles; improve lighting, fixtures, and layout to help improve 
the shopping experience; and expand their use of exclusive brands.  Besides being expensive 
to implement, none of these improvements significantly differentiated Kmart from Wal-
Mart or Target.191
The top seller program
 
192  was been moderately successful in the test market of 
Chicago - sales rose by 10%.193  The program allows local managers greater flexibility and 
control over purchasing and stocking, and the program helped alleviate some supply chain 
concerns.  The program was duplicated in Detroit, but the results were not sustainable.  The 
new program was expanded to all stores in July 2002.194
The plans for the “store of the future” were to make the stores brighter, cleaner, 
easier to navigate, and to put top selling merchandise closer to the entrance way.  It 
remained unclear what role supercenters would have in the reorganized Kmart and how the 
new initiatives would affect them.
 
195 
191 Stan Pohmer, The Kmart Saga Re-visited, Greenhouse Product News, Mar. 2003, at 3. 
192 Focuses on improving sales and in-stock positions for each store’s 300 top selling items. 
193 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 63 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL) 
194 Id. 
195 Debbie Howell, Supercenters key to Kmart's survival plan: New executive focused on execution,DSN Retailing Today, Oct. 7, 
2002, at 1. 
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Finally, the new marketing plan was to use a new customer relationship management 
(CRM) planto target minorities.196 
The CRM plan was to listen to customers, and when they want to buy a product, actually 
have the product in the store.  In short, do what Wal-Mart has been doing for years.  The 
second part of the plan is to target minorities who made up 32% of Kmart’s shoppers.197  
While it is true that this segment is the fastest growing in the United States and has a buying 
196 At the time, Kmart performed significantly better than Wal-Mart or Target in regards to minority sales.  
197 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 63 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL) 
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power of $1.2 trillion dollars, the best sales that Kmartexperienced with this group was in 
urban clusters where Wal-Mart and Target did not have a strong presence. 198
In sum, Kmart’s strategy for survival was to become more like Wal-Mart.  But this 
was troubling because direct competition with Wal-Mart is what drove Kmart into 
bankruptcy.
  It was 
unknown how much of the market share Kmart could capture of this demographic when 
forced to compete with another national retailer.  
199  At the time of Kmart’s reorganization, Wal-Mart was already implementing 
many of the strategies outlined by Kmart, and Wal-Mart had been doing this for 
decades. 200
B. Market Factors for Success
Walter Levy’s question of “why should shoppers shop at Kmart instead of Wal-
Mart or Target?” has largely been unaddressed.  
Kmart articulated a five year plan that details how Kmart will return to profitability 
by 2007.2012003 would be a transition year and would see the implementation of the store 
policies examined above.  In 2004, Kmart planned to continue its recovery and have a $1.3 
billion dollar surplus by 2007.  The company planned to record $30.2 billion in sales in 2007, 
up from $25.6 billion in 2003.  
198 Id.
199 See Chapter 2.
200 See Chapter 2.
201 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 64 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL)
(Bankr. N.D.IL).
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There are numerous assumptions that are made under this analysis.   Further, the 
factors are often difficult to predict because they are polycentric.  The considerations involve 
the return of customers after bankruptcy, the stabilization of vendor relations, the approval 
of a plan, and the success of a number of new initiatives.  Despite these complexities Kmart 
still believed it would be profitable in the coming years as evidenced by its projected cash 
flows: 
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Apart from these assumptions, there were tangible business reasons to believe Kmart 
would be successful.  As a result of chapter 11 protections, Kmart was able to shed much of 
its burdensome real estate and lease portfolio.202   This has reduced the average tent per 
square foot from approximately $4.40 to $3.99.  Additionally, 600 of the stores that were 
closed were low-volume store 203  allowing Kmart greater “rationalization” and 
“optimization.”204   The proposed budget (taking into account the aforementioned cuts) 
allows normalized maintenance to all remaining stores through fiscal 2007.  The budget also 
allows for opening 70 new stores, and approximately $175 million per year in other operating 
improvement projects.205
A second business reason for success was the shift away from pantry vendors and 
instead to rely on self-distributing these products.  Kmart rejected its supply contract with 
Fleming, a grocery vendor that previously was deemed “critical.”  The self-distributing was 
expected to occur by middle of March 2003 and would increased utilization of Kmart’s 
existing distribution centers by approximately 115 million cartons annually and reduced 
excess capacity by 89%.  Also, this method should increase sales by $450 million through 
 
202 Kmart has eliminated more than 950 real estate leases, including 340 pertaining to dark stores; it has renegotiated 
over 80 real property leases resulting in over $12 million in annual rent concessions; and has closed or identified 29% of 
its lease stores for closing, representing 49% of its lease obligations on a gross basis. 
203 Stores with annual sales less than $12 million. 
204 Store closing are expected to increase average sales per store, projected average earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, amortization per store, and average return on invested capital. 
205 Such as pharmacies, one-hour photo labs, and information technology upgrades. 
2006 and cement relationships with individual food and consumable vendors while allowing 
Kmart control over vendor allowances processes.206
Finally, Kmart assumed the contracts of its exclusive vendors, enabling the company 
to offer unique merchandise and allowing it to pursue a targeted campaign along these 
brands.
 
207 
206 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at App. D, In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL). 
207 Martha Stewart, Route 66, Kathy Ireland, Thalia, Joe Boxer, Curtis Matches, Jaclyn Smith, 123 Sesame Street, 
Disney. 
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Chapter Fourteen 
NO TIME TO QUIT: LITIGATION ROADBLOCKS 
If I owe you a pound, I have a problem; but if I owe you a million, the problem is yours. 
John Maynard Keynes 
The committee of unsecured creditors threatened to prevent confirmation of the plan 
by starting four types of litigation.   
i. Fraudulent Transfers
First, the committee of unsecured creditors threatened extended litigation over 
various transfers made by Kmart over the two years preceding the bankruptcy.  Section 548 
of the bankruptcy code provides that the trustee may avoid certain transfers of property 
made within two years of the petition date.208  From 1998 to 2000, Kmart transferred assets 
to various subsidiaries.  Specifically, Kmart transferred to each subsidiary the assets 
constituting the business operations located in the respective states of each Kmart 
subsidiary.  These assets included real estate and inventory comprising the retail stores and 
certain distribution centers. In exchange for the transfer of these assets, Kmart became the 
owner of all the equity of the subsidiaries.  Thus, as of the Petition Date, the subsidiaries 
owned approximately 20% of the Debtor’s aggregate real estate and inventory. 
208 See 11 U.S.C. § 548.Two types of transfers are avoidable.  First, transfers of property are avoidable if they were 
made with the “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” any present or future creditor.  Second, transfers of property 
are avoidable if the debtor received “less than a reasonably equivalent value,” and was insolvent, had unreasonably 
small capital, intended to incur un-repayable debts, or made the transfer to a business insider under an employment 
contract. 
208 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 70, In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL) 
(Bankr. N.D.IL). 
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Further, in October 2000, Kmart of Michigan, Inc. (“KMI”) became the owner of 
substantially all the trademarks, service marks, and trade names used in the Kmart business, 
including the name “Kmart,” the big red K logo, “Super K” and similar marks.  KMI 
licensed the marks in exchange for royalty fees at a contract rate of approximately 1% of 
such entities gross revenue.  These fees averaged revenue of $75 million a quarter.209  When 
Kmart paid KMI’s royalty fee, KMI immediately loaned it back to Kmart.  As of the petition 
date, KMI had an intercompany claim against Kmart in the amount of $316 million.210
ii. The Committee Requests Substantive Consolidation
 
Second, the unsecured creditors committee also threatened to litigate whether the 
various Kmart subsidiaries should be “substantively consolidated.”  They argued that the 
separate entities of Kmart should be disregarded pursuant to an “alter ego” and “piercing of 
the corporate veil” theories.211
The legal standing for this argument is derived from Section 105(a) of the bankruptcy 
code. This section provides that the court may issue orders “necessary” to carry out the 
  This would result in a pooling of their assets for the benefit 
of all creditors and not just the pre-petition lenders. 
209 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 70, In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL) 
(Bankr. N.D.IL). 
210 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 70, In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL) 
(Bankr. N.D.IL). 
211 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 70 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL) 
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provisions of the bankruptcy code.212
The two factors courts usually rely on in determining the allowance of substantive 
consolidation are (1) whether the creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit 
and did not rely on their separate identity in extending credit and (2) whether the affairs of 
the debtors are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.
  There are no statutorily prescribed standards dealing 
with when substantive consolidation is allowed. 
213
In Kmart’s case, the unsecured creditors argued that Kmart met the test for the first 
factor.  Kmart, through its corporate department, provided services to all Kmart entities.
 
214 
As a collective whole, the pre-petition lenders held most of the pre-petition, impaired, 
unsecured claims against the Kmart of subsidiaries.  The unsecured creditors asserted that 
they were entitled to substantially all the value in Kmart’s subsidiaries.  As a result, they 
argued that the other creditors of Kmart, including trade vendors and other unsecured 
creditors, should not be distributed any value from the Kmart of subsidiaries until the pre-
petition lenders were paid in full.215
On the other hand, Kmart argued that the creditors did not deal with the Kmart 
entities as a single economic unit.  Rather, the pre-petition lenders obtained separate 
 
212 11 U.S.C. §105, A second well can be drawn from section 1123(a)(5)(C). 
213 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 71 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL) 
214 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 72 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No.02-02474 (BRL) 
(Bankr. N.D.IL).  These services included accounting and bookkeeping, treasury, legal, tax, informational systems, 
administrative, real estate management, store planning, construction and design, human resources administration, 
“back office” corporate services and shared a centralized cash management system.  Id. 
215 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 72 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No.02-02474 (BRL) 
(Bankr. N.D.IL).  
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subsidiaries guarantees from each Kmart subsidiary.  Further, the separate entities had their 
own real estate, executory contracts, and inventory.216
On the second prong of the test, the unsecured creditors committee argued that 
historically Kmart filed consolidated financial statements.  Moreover, Kmart’s corporate 
department provided service to all Kmart entities including accounting, bookkeeping, 
treasury, legal, tax, information systems, administrative, real estate management, store 
planning, construction and design, human resource administration, and similar “back office” 
corporate services.  The entities also share a centralized cash management system. 
 
On the flip side, Kmart could have argued that not all creditors dealt with the Kmart 
entities as a single economic unit-prepetition lenders obtained separate subsidiary guarantees 
from each subsidiary.  Furthermore, each subsidiary has separate real estate leases and 
executory contracts, and each owns its own real estate and inventory.  Alternatively, Kmart 
could argue that substantive consolidation was not in the best interest of all creditors, 
eliminating it as an option.217
iii. Preference Claims
 
As a general matter, a “preference” under the bankruptcy code is a payment made by 
a debtor to a creditor within the 90 days prior to the petition date if the payment is on 
account of a pre-existing debt owed by the debtor to the creditor.  Kmart made over $1 
216 Id.In fact, the pre-petition lenders could argue that substantive consolidation would harm them.  The pre-petition 
lenders would have only one claim against the consolidated pool of assets, and their anticipated recovery on that single 
claim would be diluted by claims of all other unsecured creditors.  Because some pre-petition lenders would receive 
less for their claims due to substantive consolidation, Kmart argued that consolidation was not in the best interests 
of all creditors.   
217 This is because if the entities were substantively consolidated, the subsidiary guarantees would be eliminated, and the 
prepetition lenders’ asserted priority entitlement to the subsidiaries would be lost.  Furthermore, the claims would be 
diluted by the claims of all other unsecured creditors. 
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billion preference payment to Fleming, $422 million on taxes; over $410 million in real estate 
payments, $8. 3 million in intercompany loans among affiliates; $2.2 billion in payments to 
pre-petition lenders on loan pay downs; $106 million in interest on pre-petition notes $248 
million to Kmart’s joint venture partners; and $108 million in employee benefit payments 
(not including payroll). 218
As a general matter, if creditor provides a debtor with “new value” after the creditor 
has received a payment from the debtor and the new value remains unpaid as of the petition 
date, it can be deducted from the amount of the new value from the previous preferential 
transfer.  Similarly, payments are made by a debtor on account of goods and services 
acquired in the “ordinary course” of business; they may be exempt from recovery by a 
debtor under the preference statutes.
 
219
Kmart identified all transfers made by them to all persons within the 90-day 
preference period.  Based on this analysis, approximately $6 billion in preferential payments 
could be subject to recovery under the bankruptcy code.
 
220
Asserting the “ordinary course” defense requires an intensive fact-based analysis that 
is polycentric and involves nebulas facts.  Because of this, the defense and successful claim is 
  Of the $6 billion in claims, 
approximately $1.86 could be classified as “new value.”  Additionally, $2.18 billion could be 
classified under the “ordinary course” umbrella.  The remaining $2 billion fall outside both 
categories.  
218 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 103, In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No.02-02474 
(BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL).  
219 Id. 
220 This amount does not include preferential amounts made to trade vendors and service providers. 
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highly uncertain, very risky, and expensive to litigate.  There is also the possibility that the 
Debtors were insolvent at the time of alleged preferential payments were made.  
After applying the estimated costs of litigation, and the risks involved in such 
litigation, the Debtors estimate that the potential recovery would range from $240 million 
and $405 million.221
iv. Trust Claims
 
The bankruptcy code permits a court to appoint a trustee under section 1104(a) of 
the bankruptcy code.222  The UST must move for the appointment of a trustee if there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect that parties have participated in fraud or dishonest conduct.223
Also, the appointment of a trustee can be appointed on “request of a party in interest.”
 
224  In 
the Kmart case, a trustee was appointed by the court to investigate the mismanagement and 
fraud committed by the company’s senior management.225 
221 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 104 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No.02-02474 (BRL) 
(Bankr. N.D.IL).  
222 Appointment may be “for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of 
the debtor” or “if such appointment is in the best interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interest 
of the estate” or if grounds exist to convert or dismiss the case under §1112, but the court determines that the 
appointment of the trustee or examiner is in the best interests of creditors and the estate.  
223 11 U.S.C. §1104(e). 
224 “If the court does order the appointment of a trustee under this section, then any time before the confirmation of a 
plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States Trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order 
the appointment of an examiner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate, including an 
investigation of any allegations of fraud, dishonest, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the 
management of the affairs of the debtor of or by current or former management of the debtor if (1) such appointment is 
in the interests of the creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate; or (2) the debtor’s fixed, 
liquidated, unsecured debts, other than debts for goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000.” 
11. U.S.C. §1104(c).
225 The members accused of fraud were fired and no longer employed by Kmart when the investigations were taking
place.
84 
The Debtors admitted that evidence indicates that the estates have claims against 
former officers on grounds that they were grossly derelict in performing their duties to the 
company, its associates, vendors, and investors, for claims such as breach of fiduciary duties 
of due care, loyalty and candor, gross negligence, and certain bankruptcy-related causes of 
action. 226   In addition, management also breached contract and conducted misconduct 
against certain third party vendors who purported to provide consulting services to 
Kmart.227  Finally, there are numerous allegations issued against Charles Conway directly.228 
226 For example, in summer 2001, a senior executive directed initiatives that resulted in the excessive purchase of 
inventory without sufficient analysis and oversight, and without appropriate consultation with the merchant community 
or Kmart’s treasury officials in the amount of $850 million. 
227 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 44 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL) 
(Bankr. N.D.IL). 
228 The complaints filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan alleged that Mr. 
Conway made material misstatements or omission during the alleged class period that inflated the trading prices of 
Kmart’s common stock and seek, damages under section 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and section 
410 of the Michigan uniform Securities Act. Kmart is not a defendant in this litigation. 
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Chapter Fifteen 
BEST INTERESTS: KMART’S LIQUIDATION ANALYSIS 
Should you find yourself in a chronically leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more 
productive than energy devoted to patching leaks. 
Warren Buffett 
Under Section 1129(a)(7) of the bankruptcy code, Kmart was required to prove that 
the reorganization was in the best interests of the creditors.  Kmart needed to show three 
things:  (1) the total value of the outstanding claims against Kmart; (2) the value of these 
claims if Kmart was liquidated; (3) the value of the claims if Kmart was reorganized.  The 
purpose of the liquidation analysis is to provide information in order that the bankruptcy 
court may determine that the plan of reorganization is in the best interests of all classes of 
creditors and equity interest holders impaired by the plan.229
i. Outstanding claims
 
The last date for setting claims against the Debtors’ was July, 31 2002.After this date, 
the debtors had a total of 44,935 claims filed against them asserting claims in the total face 
amount of $75.2 billion. However, Alix Partners determined that many of these “claims” 
were invalid or duplicates.230 
229 The “best interest test” requires that a bankruptcy court find that the plan provides to each member of each impaired 
class a recovery that has a value at least equal to the value of the distribution each member would receive if Kmart 
were liquidated under Chapter 7.  
230 PBGC claims (the government agency that affords certain guarantees of pension plan liabilities) had claims of 
almost $41 billion that would not be realized because the Debtors intended to continue paying their pension obligations. 
Furthermore, Alix Partners determined that there were$12.4 billion in duplicate claims.   
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Vehicle of recovery $ in millions 
No plan or liquidation $ 75, 200, 000, 000 
Plan $ 8, 000, 000, 000 
Liquidation $ 18, 000, 000, 000 
ii. Value in liquidation
The liquidation value to unsecured creditors is not a simple matter of determine the 
aggregate value of the assets. The pie is first reduced by the secured creditors to the extent of 
the value of their collateral, including the value of goods delivered on consignment to the 
extent this interest is perfected followed by the costs and expenses of liquidation, including 
administrative expenses and costs of both the chapter 7 and chapter 11 cases.231
In a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation of Kmart, Alix Partners estimated that the 
total value of the unsecured claims would range from $11.7 billion to $18.2 billion.
 
232  For 
purposes of the analysis, Alix Partners assumed that liquidation would require three phases 
and would take place over 18 months.  Phase 1 would comprise a three-month period during 
which inventories would be sold in a going-out-of-business sale conducted by a third party.  
231 Costs include the compensation of a trustee as well as of counsel and other professionals retained by the trustee, asset 
disposition expenses, all unpaid expenses incurred by the debtor in its bankruptcy case that are allowed in the chapter 7 
case, litigation costs, and claims arising from the operation of the debtor during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. 
Second, the liquidation itself would trigger certain priority payments that would otherwise be due in the ordinary course 
of business. Finally, the liquidation would trigger the rejection of a large number of executory contracts and unexpired 
leases and thereby create a significantly higher number of unsecured claims. However, holders of rights of letter of 
credit beneficiaries are generally not affected by liquidation.  
232 The difference in amounts will be discussed in the liquidation section. Disclosure Statement with Respect to First 
Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 
105 , In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL) (Bankr. N.D.IL). 
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By the end of this sale, substantially all store, distribution center, and field associates would 
be terminated.  Phase 2 would comprise the next six month period and would sell off 
Kmart’s real estate.  Further, most of the company’s non-real estate fixed assets would be 
marketed.  Additionally, headquarter operations would “wind down.”  Phase 3 would 
comprise a nine month period after the real estate sale during which any remaining litigation 
would be pursued, final tax returns filed, bankruptcy reports and schedules filed and 
remaining assets disposed. 
The value of Kmart in liquidation fluctuates mainly because of two factors.  First, in 
the event of liquidation, the aggregate amount of unsecured claims will increase significantly 
(as reflected in the high range estimate), and such claims will be subordinated to priority 
claims that will be created.233
iii. Value under plan
   Secondly, the assets in liquidation are sold at a forced sale and 
therefore are sold at a deep discount. 
The value of Kmart under the plan is approximately $3 billion dollars. 234   The 
members of each impaired class would receive at least as much under the plan as they would 
in liquidation in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.  Creditors and interest-holders would 
receive a better recovery through the distributions contemplated by the plan because the 
continued operations of Kmart as a going concern, would allow for the realization of more 
value for Kmart’s assets and reduce claims against the estate.235 
233 For example, employees would file claims for wages, pensions, and other benefits, some of which will be entitled to 
priority.  Further, landlords would likely file large claims for both unsecured and priority amounts. The resulting increase 
in both general unsecured and priority claims would decrease percentage recoveries to unsecured creditors of Kmart. 
234 See chapter 11 for a detailed discussion of the valuation.  
235 The assets the estate holds can be valued at their fair market value rather than a discounted rate because of the 
forced liquidating sale. 
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Chapter Sixteen 
NEW HORIZONS: APPROVAL OF THE PLAN 
Four steps to achievement: Plan purposefully. Prepare prayerfully. Proceed positively. Pursue persistently. 
William Arthur Ward 
A. The Plan Proposal
Kmart proposed a global settlement of their claims, embodied by the plan that 
affords distributions to their constituencies commensurate with the risks of their litigation 
positions. Under section 1123(b)(3)(A) of the bankruptcy code and rule 9019 of the 
bankruptcy rules, a settlement, such as the plan, should be approved if it represents a 
reasonable compromise that is in the collective best interests of all constituencies in light of 
risks of continued litigation. The settlement need not afford the best possible recovery to 
any particular constituency, but instead need only represent a recovery that falls within a 
reasonable range of litigation possibilities. The necessary creditors and debtors believed the 
plan to meet those standards. 
B. Voting
Claimholders and interest holders in each impaired class are entitled to vote in their 
respective classes as a class to accept or reject the Plan.  Classes 1, 2, and 3 are unimpaired 
by the plan.  Therefore, under section 1126(f) of the bankruptcy code, they are conclusively 
presumed to have accepted the plan.  Because all debtors are proponents of the plan, class 8 
and 12 are deemed to have accepted the plan.  The remaining classes (4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 
and 12) are impaired.  Accordingly, under section 1126(c) of the bankruptcy code, except as 
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provided in 1126(e), an impaired class has accepted the Plan if the Plan is accepted by the 
holders of at least two-thirds in dollar amount and more than one-half in number of the 
allowed claims of such class that have timely and properly voted to accept or reject the 
plan.236
Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a plan can be confirmed even 
if it has not been accepted by all impaired classes as long as at least one impaired class of 
claims has accepted it.  The court can confirm the plan, at the request of Kmart, 
notwithstanding the plan’s deemed rejection by impaired classes so long as it “does not 
discriminate unfairly” and is “fair
  Section 1126(d) states that an impaired class of interest has accepted the plan if it is 
accepted by at least two-thirds in amount of the allowed interest of such class that have 
timely and properly voted to accept or reject the plan. 
237 and equitable”238 to each impaired class that has not 
accepted the plan.239  The votes of holders of subordinated securities claims and interests in 
Kmart are not being solicited.  Therefore, they are deemed to have rejected the plan 
pursuant to section 1126(g) of the Bankruptcy Code.  On April 11, 2003, Kmart filed the 
voting report certifying the method and result of the ballet tabulation for each voting 
236 11 U.S.C. 1129(e). 
237 A plan is fair and equitable as to a class of secured claims that rejects the plan if the plan provides (1) that the holder 
of claims included in rejecting class retain the liens securing those clams, and (2) that each holder of a claim of such 
class receives on account of that claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of that claim, as of 
the effective date. 
238 A plan is fair and equitable as to a class of unsecured claims that rejects the plan if the plan provides (1) for each 
holder of a claim included in the rejecting class to receive or retain on account of that claim property that has a value, as 
of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or (2) that the holder of any claim or interest 
that is junior to the clams of such rejecting class will not receive or retain on account of such junior claim or interest any 
property at all. 
239 A plan does not discriminate unfairly within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code if a dissenting class is treated 
equally with respect to other classes of equal rank. 
class.240
C. Effective Date
  Accordingly, Kmart passed plan pursuant to section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code on April 23, 2003. 
On the effective date the plan goes into effect thus triggering several important 
events. 
i. Contributions
On the effective date, the Plan Investors will pay Kmart in cash pursuant to the terms 
and conditions in the investment agreement. 
ii. Post-effective date financing
On the effective date, Kmart will enter into the exit financing facility agreement in 
order to repay the DIP facility claims, make payments required on the effective date, and 
conduct their post-reorganization operations.  Exit financing is of paramount importance to 
any reorganizing plan because every business must have necessary funds to operate.  Kmart, 
along with their investment banker and financial advisor, Miller Buckfire Lewis, solicited 
commitments of $2 billion dollars in exit financing upon terms acceptable to the creditors. 
After extensive negotiations, the Debtors agreed to the exit lenders proposal.  On January 
14, 2003, the Debtors filed a motion requesting authority to accept the commitment letter 
and to pay expenses in connection therewith.  On January 28, 2003, the Bankruptcy Court 
entered an order granting the requested relief.  The authorization of the letter and associated 
expenses are administrative claims. 
240 The only rejecting classes were the deemed rejected classes. 
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iii. Trust preservation
Pursuant to section 1123(b)(3) of the bankruptcy code, Kmart will retain and may 
enforce any retained actions pending on the effective date, except those specifically excluded 
by the plan. 
iv. Executory contracts and unexpired leases
Unless provided for in article 8.1(c) of the plan, each executory contract and 
unexpired lease is deemed automatically assumed in accordance with sections 365 and 1123 
of the bankruptcy code.241
v. New existence
 
Perhaps most importantly, Kmart will take all steps necessary to form New Holding 
Company and New Operating Company pursuant to their respective certificates of 
incorporation and by-laws.242  Secondly, contribute and transfer all assets of Kmart, other 
than qualified real estate and trust assets to entities contemplated by the restructuring 
transactions.  Finally, issue all of the New Operating Company common stock to New 
Holding Company.243 
241 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 68, In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL) 
(Bankr. N.D.IL). 
242 Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of Kmart Corporation and its 
Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 109, In re Kmart Corporation, et al.,  Ch. 11 Case No. 02-02474 (BRL) 
(Bankr. N.D.IL). 
243 The articles of incorporation and bylaws of New Holding Company will authorize (a) five-hundred million 
(500,000,000) shares of New Holding Company Common Stock, $0.01 par value per share; (b) authorize twenty million 
(20,000,000) shares of New Holding Company preferred stock for future issuance upon terms designated by the board 
of directors  of the New Holding Company; (c) provide, pursuant to §1123(a)(6) of the bankruptcy code, provisions 
prohibiting the issuance of non-voting equity stock for two years from the effective date, and provisions setting forth 
voting power among classes of equity securities possessing voting power.   
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Chapter Seventeen 
FAIRY TALES: KMART FROM 2003-2010 
If you want a happy ending, that depends, of course, on where you stop your story. 
Orson Welles 
Senior management of Kmart lived the life of rock stars and divas.  They had gated 
estates, yachts, company jets, and saw their perks, bonuses, and loans increase while their 
company reported loss to the tune of $3.9 billion dollars in a mere five quarters.244  The life 
of excess in the lives of rock stars is something that may be strived for in a capitalist society, 
but when it corporate America gets in the act, there are real tangible losses. Over 70,000 
workers lost their jobs and millions of stock-holders lost their retirement plans because the 
actions of Kmart.245
A. Executive management
  To understand the effect of the Kmart case, the management, average 
Joes, and the Kmart Corporation will be explored.  
As expected, within 50 days of the Petition date, the debtors replaced almost all 
members of senior management.246  In their wake, several new members were appointed in 
their place.247  Further, the newly appointed board did not crack down on financial payments 
244 Max Oritz, Kmart's Road to Bankruptcy, The Detroit News, Aug. 12, 2002. 
245 Karen Dybis, Kmart's woes trickle down: Suppliers, malls and even retailer's hometown suffer along with laid-off 
workers, The Detroit News, Feb. 24, 2003. 
246 Charles Conway (CEO), Mark Schwartz (President), John McDonald (EVP, CFO), David Rots (CAO) were all 
separated from their employment with Kmart by March 11, 2002. 
247 James Adamson became (CEO), Ronald Hutchison was named chief restructuring officer, Albert Koch was 
appointed (CFO), Edward Stenger was named (treasurer), Julian Day was named (president and COO), Michael Macik 
became(EVP of HR), William Underwood was appointed (EVP of sourcing & global operations). 
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to ex-executives.  It seems that the board operated under the “good-old-boys” framework 
and awarded their former colleges’ golden parachutes despite the rampant allegations of 
fraud, deceit, and corruption.  The chart below illustrates the payments made.248 
It is significant to note the funds given out were latter limited not by the company, but by 
court decree.249
B. Average Joes
 
At the time of the Petition Date, Kmart had over 519 million outstanding shares of 
stock that would soon become worth nothing.250  The stock had already lost over 86% of its 
value since the start of the year and was tradingat a 38 year low.251  The bankruptcy also has 
a devastating effect on employees of Kmart. A manager at a Texas store told the Free 
Pressthat the company announcement “was devastating, just devastating.  It’s just that you’re 
never ready.”  Employees, he said, were hurt, angry and afraid, “all those emotions that 
248 Max Oritz, Kmart's Road to Bankruptcy, The Detroit News, Aug. 12, 2002. 
249 Kmart would have given the executives their negotiated benefits. Only when forced by the creditors were 
the payments retracted. Max Oritz, Kmart's Road to Bankruptcy, The Detroit News, Aug. 12, 2002. 
250 Karen Dybis, Kmart Plan Guts Investors, The Detroit News, Jan. 19, 2003. 
251 Rebecca Byrne, Meet the Street: Bankruptcy Not Expected to KO Kmart, The Street, Jan. 23, 2002. 
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come with uncertainty.”252  By the time Kmart had finished reorganizing, more than 60,000 
employees had lost their jobs and 600 stores were closed.253
The consequences of a bankruptcy not only affect Kmart directly, but the thousands 
of business, municipalities, and employees that depended on Kmart to bring in sales.  A 
retail consultant said a significant number of former Kmart store locations will remain 
vacant for significant periods of time.  The resulting decline in shoppers will devastate many 
small businesses, and cause strip centers to fold.  "Kmart is well-defined as a wrecking crew, 
and my position is the wreckage will continue."
  The holders of common stock 
received no distributions under the plan. 
254  For example, Penske Auto Centers cut 
more than 4,000 employees in April alone because of Kmart’s bankruptcy.255  Despite debts 
to the private sector, Kmart also left behind bills to be passed on to municipalities that will 
be doubly hit on the bankruptcy, first because of not receiving the taxes they are owed, and 
second in the loss revenue from employees and business operations.  For example, the city 
of Troy MI, was owed $213,000 in taxes according to city records that remain unpaid.256 
252 Id. 
253 Stan Pohmer, The Kmart Saga Re-visited, Greenhouse Product News, Mar. 2003, at 3. 
254 Karen Dybis, Kmart's woes trickle down: Suppliers, malls and even retailer's hometown suffer along with laid-
off workers, The Detroit News, Feb. 24, 2003. 
255Id. 
256 Id. 
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C. The end of Kmart
In November 2004, Kmart Holdings bought Sears Roebuck for $11 billion dollars 
and merged the companies to create Sears Holdings.257  Sears Holding is the third largest 
general merchandise retail company in the United States.  The company was formed in 2005 
by the merger of Sears Roebuck (Sears) and Kmart Holdings.  The merger was coordinated 
by Edward Lampert, the current Chairman, whom now holds over 54% of the shares 
outstanding through his hedge fund ESL Investments.258  The idea behind the merger of 
Kmart and Sears was to combine the strengths of companies, the reputation for quality and 
service of Sears, and the low prices of Kmart.  The company generated $44 billion in sales in 
2009.259  Despite the high volume of sales, profits have not followed.  The recession that 
followed the 2007-08 housing collapse has not been kind to the new company as its sales 
decreased 5.1% in 2009 and the company’s net income fell from $1.5 billion in 2006 to a 
mere $253 million in 2009.260
It appears that Kmart’s assets were not properly valued in the reorganization.  
Analysts from Deutsche bank conducted an independent analysis and concluded that the real 
estate was substantially undervalued.
  The “Kmart” division of Sears Holdings contributed only 
35.7% in sales to Sears Holdings in 2009.   
261  Because of the bankruptcy process, Kmart had an 
257 2011 Reorgs Database\Documents Database\News Articles\Sears Holding current.docxWiki 
Analysis, http://www.wikinvest.com. 
258 Parija Bhatnagar, The Kmart-Sears Deal, CNN, Nov. 17, 2004. 
259 2011 Reorgs Database\Documents Database\News Articles\Sears Holding current.docxWiki 
Analysis, http://www.wikinvest.com. 
260 Id. 
261[who] Concluded that the stock could be valued as high as $152.95 a share. 
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average rent of $2.03 per square foot per store while other comparable retailer’s average was 
$10.07.262  Because of the severity of this undervaluation, Kmart sold off its stores piece by 
piece thereby receiving maximum value for them.263  The Deutsche bank report noted that 
the department stores were "the mother lode of real estate value."  As late of July 2004, it 
was still unsure if Kmart would liquidate or try to turn itself around.264  For example, in June 
2004, Kmart sold 78 of its stores to Sears and Home Depot for $965 million.265
According to its most recent financial statements, Sears Holding is doing well and is 
profitable.
 
266 
262 Id. 
263 2011 Reorgs Database\Documents Database\News Articles\Sears Holding current.docxWiki Analysis, 
http://www.wikinvest.com. 
264 Stan Pohmer, The Kmart Saga Re-visited,  Lawn & Garden Retailer   March 2003   Volume: 2 Number: 3. 
265 Kmart stock soars with release of analyst report. 
266 The company had net-income during the fourth quarter of $474 million and a yearly net-income of $133 million 
in 2010. 2011 Reorgs Database\Documents Database\News Articles\SHLD discussion of KMART.docx. 
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Chapter Eighteen 
THE HAND OF JUSTICE: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS 
If you have ten thousand regulations you destroy all respect for the law. 
Winston Churchill 
On January 22, 2004, the Seventh Circuit heard arguments on Kmart’s critical vendor 
motion.  The court upheld the order of District Judge Grady, holding that the “critical” 
vendors should not have been paid in full for pre-petition claims.267
A. Seventh Circuit Opinion
 
The court noted that, out of approximately 4,330 vendors, Kmart decided that 2,330 
of these were “critical.”  The critical vendors were paid in full for Kmart’s pre-petition debt.   
The other 2,000 vendors, along with 43,000 additional creditors, “eventually received about 
10¢ on the dollar, mostly in stock of the reorganized Kmart.”268
Kmart first argued that by the time Judge Grady reversed the order authorizing 
payment, it was too late and the money could not be refunded.  However, the Seventh 
Circuit noted that “[r]eversing preferential transfers is an ordinary feature of bankruptcy 
practice, often continuing under a confirmed plan of reorganization.”  Although debt 
incurred through a DIP financing order is not reversible under the bankruptcy code, 
“[n]othing comparable anywhere in the Code covers payments made to pre-existing, 
unsecured creditors, whether or not the debtor calls them ‘critical.’”
 
269 
267 In re Kmart, 359 F.3d 866, 874 (7th Cir., 2004).  
268 Id. at 869. 
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Next, Kmart argued that it relied to its detriment on the original order.  The court 
held that, although the “critical vendors” continued selling goods and services to Kmart in 
exchange for the payment of pre-petition debts, this was not “detrimental reliance.” They were 
paid in full for all of the post-petition goods and services that they provided to Kmart – and 
so the court found that, although perhaps there was some kind of reliance on the order, 
there was no detriment to the vendors.270
The Seventh Circuit then turned its attention to the asserted authority for the 
payment – Section 105(a).  “Section 105(a) allows a bankruptcy court to “issue any order, 
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the 
Code.”  However, the Seventh Circuit held that this section does not give the bankruptcy 
court the authority to override the rules of bankruptcy, but rather only to implement them.   
Although the “doctrine of necessity” is found in some very old cases, the court found that it 
“is just a fancy name for a power to depart from the Code.”  Further, the cases where the 
doctrine originated, which were decided in the late 1800’s, predate the first general effort to 
codify the rules of bankruptcy.  The court dismissed this old caselaw, noting that “[o]lder 
doctrines may survive as glosses on ambiguous language enacted in 1978 or later, but not as 
freestanding entitlements to trump the text.
 
271
Regardless of ancient doctrines or any possible interpretation of the code, the 
Seventh Circuit found that the critical vendor order was unsound on its face.  The premise 
 
269 Id.
270 Id. at 869.
271 Id. at 871.
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of the original order was “the belief that vendors not paid for prior deliveries will refuse to 
make new ones.”272
For the premise to hold true, however, it is necessary to show 
not only that the disfavored creditors will be as well off with 
reorganization as with liquidation – a demonstration never 
attempted in this proceeding – but also that the supposedly 
critical vendors would have ceased deliveries if old debts were 
left unpaid while the litigation continued.   If vendors will 
deliver against a promise of current payment, then a 
reorganization can be achieved, and all unsecured creditors will 
obtain its benefit, without preferring any of the unsecured 
creditors.
  The court noted: 
273
B. Critical Commentary
 
Rather than providing clarity, the Seventh Circuit’s decision resulted in further 
confusion regarding the viability of “critical vendor” orders.  In April 2004, H. Bradley 
Staggs wrote in the American Bankruptcy Institute Journal that the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Kmart created “further uncertainty as to a bankruptcy court’s authority to enter a 
critical-vendor order.”  Although the court shut the door to any attempt to use § 105(a) or 
the doctrine of necessity, the court noted in dicta that § 363(b)(1) might provide 
authorization if (1) the “critical” vendors would cease providing goods to the debtor without 
payment, and (2) the entry of the critical-vendor order is in the best interests of the estate.  
Staggs notes that adherence to these requirements might require the debtor, in the first few 
days of its bankruptcy, to “present a liquidation analysis to the bankruptcy court that would 
reflect a lower percentage recovery for pre-petition creditors (including non-critical vendors) 
as compared to the recovery such creditors would receive under a theoretical chapter 11 plan 
272 Id. at 872.
273 Id. at 873.
100 
that may eventually be confirmed after the debtor makes payments to critical vendors.”  It is 
unlikely, he claimed, that a debtor would be able to make this showing.  As well, the 
comments by the court regarding § 363(b)(1) are just dicta.   A vendor relying upon a court’s 
grant of critical vendor status under § 363(b)(1) would have no guarantee that the payment 
would not be subject to subsequent avoidance.274
A few months later, in June 2004, commentators were more hopeful for the 
resurrection of the critical vendor doctrine.  A paper entitled “Down, But Not Out: The 
Status off Critical-Vendor Payments Post-Kmart” noted that the Seventh Circuit’s dicta had 
already been used to “authorize the full payment of at least one debtor’s pre-petition wage 
obligations.”
 
275  The paper predicted the following effects of the decision:  First, debtors 
would be limited to only the most critical vendors, and they would need to meet the high 
burden of proof of showing that each vendor “has, in fact, threatened to stop supplying 
goods unless paid its pre-petition obligations.”  Further, “debtors seeking critical vendor 
orders should consider providing their non-critical vendors with notice of their critical 
vendor motions” to prevent any allegation of insufficient notice.  Despite these limitations, 
the paper expressed the opinion that the critical vendor doctrine was not “killed” by the 
Seventh Circuit: “this decision merely adds a new metaphorical ‘wrinkle’ to a ‘crumpled’ 
doctrine. 276 
274 H. Bradley Staggs, Critical-Vendor Orders: Has the Seventh Circuit Put Such Orders on the Critical List?, 23 Am. Bankr. Inst. 
J. 16 (Apr., 2004).
275 SeeIn re Jays Foods L.L.C., Final Order Under 11 U.S.C. §§363(b) & 507(a) (authorizing (1) the payment of pre-
petition employee obligations and the continuation of employee benefit plans and programs post-petition, and (2)
directing all banks to honor pre-petition checks for payment of employee obligations).
276 James H.M. Sprayregen, James A. Stempel, et al., Down But Not Out: The Status of Critical-Vendor Payments Post-Kmart,
23 A. Bank. Inst. J. 26 (June 2004).
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Chapter Nineteen 
FORTUNE COOKIES 
Your best teacher is your last mistake. 
Ralph Nader 
A. Ride the Waves
Chapter 11 bankruptcies often place all the parties involved on unstable footing.  The
Debtor needs to avoid getting pushed over by demands from creditor, creditors need to 
compromise to maximize the value of the estate, and the legal system attempts to establish 
just remedies.  Just like in surfing, a debtor has to find a big wave and ride it out to the end.  
The surfer has to have skill, knowledge, and speed to make it until the end or otherwise face 
a wipeout.  
Kmart did not know how it would compete with Wal-Mart or Target but knew that it 
could survive by focusing on its premium brands.  Kmart’s plan was to exit bankruptcy as 
soon as possible and become a thinner company by cutting stores and employees.  As long 
as the company does not get pushed over and keeps going, it should be ok.  
B. Have a good publicist
A company usually enters chapter 11 because they have made some mistakes along
the way.  When talking in front of a judge or creditors it is important to focus on what the 
company did right and how they plan to do better in the future.  Kmart did not state that its 
board had no control over its CEO and COO, or had no plan to compete with Wal-Mart, 
and Target.  Instead it focused on acknowledging isolated incidents of bad judgment and 
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suggested ways to avoid the situation in the future.  Kmart presented itself as a wiser 
company who learned from its mistakes to the creditors, judge, and public.  
C. Don’t make assumptions
As noted above, JDA was denied an administrative claim even though it performed
post-petition services requested by Kmart.  The teaching of this ruling is that vendors cannot 
assume that post-petition work completed for debtors will receive administrative status.  
“Depending on the circumstances, a cautious vendor might want to proceed on the 
assumption that administrative claim status will not be available.”277
A vendor in this situation has several options.  First, they may “request a payment 
method such as payment in advance or payment upon delivery or seek to secure the debtor’s 
payment obligations through a letter of credit.”  For instance, “JDA could have insisted that 
Kmart post a deposit with JDA or arrange for the issuance of a letter of credit in favor of 
JDA or a guarantee of payment from a credit-worthy third party.”
   
278  Second, a vendor may 
force the debtor to assume the pre-petition contract before performing any work.  This 
would protect the defendant from being left with a “a low-priority pre-petition general 
unsecured claim for its damages from the debtor’s rejection or cancellation of the 
contract.”279  Regardless of the structure of the post-petition transaction, a creditor should 
be careful, as a transfer might be viewed as an unauthorized transfer of property subject to 
277 Joseph Cioffi, Protections For Vendors in a Customer’s Bankruptcy May Not Be As Expected, The Metroplitan Corporate 
Counsel, June 2004. 
278 Bruce S. Nathan, Trade Creditors Beware: Providing Post-Petition Goods and Services to a Chapter 11 Debtor Under a Pre-
Petition Contract Without Protection Can Be Toxic to Collectibility, Business Credit, September 2003. 
279 Bruce S. Nathan, Trade Creditors Beware: Providing Post-Petition Goods and Services to a Chapter 11 Debtor Under a Pre-
Petition Contract Without Protection Can Be Toxic to Collectibility, Business Credit, September 2003. 
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avoidance under 11 U.S.C. §549.  In any case, it might be wise for a vendor to seek explicit 
permission from the bankruptcy court before performing any services post-petition.280
D. Know your jurisdiction: Kmart’s effect on the critical vendor motion
 
Although some commentators predicted an end to the critical vendor doctrine, these
dire predictions have not come to pass.  Mark A. McDermott,281
• First Circuit – no published decisions;
 one of the lawyers who 
represented Kmart, noted in late 2006 that predictions of a possible end to the doctrine were 
“overdrawn.”  “In fact, the Kmart decision is the only court of appeals ruling that clearly 
delineates, albeit in dictum, the circumstances under which payments may be made to pre-
petition creditors outside the context of a plan.”  At the end of 2006, the positions of the 
Circuit Courts with regard to critical vendor orders were as follows: 
• Second Circuit – debtors may honor pre-petition obligations outside the context of a
plan if necessary to the reorganization;282
• Third Circuit – debtors may honor pre-petition obligations outside the context of a
plan if necessary to the reorganization;283
• Fourth Circuit – court of appeals held that § 105(a) affords no authority for a debtor
to pay pre-petition claims prior to plan confirmation;284
280 Joseph Cioffi, Protections For Vendors in a Customer’s Bankruptcy May Not Be As Expected, The Metroplitan Corporate 
Counsel, June 2004.  
281 See Cast of Characters.  McDermott, among others, filed Kmart’s critical vendor motion, and may not be an unbiased 
source of information on this topic.   
282 Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1945) (granting priority status to supply creditors where services or goods 
were necessary to ensure continued operation of hotel). 
283 In re Lehigh & New Eng. Ry. Co., 657 F.2d 570, 581 (3d Cir. 1981) (authorizing payment to creditors under “necessity 
of payment” doctrine where payment “is in the interest of all parties ... [and] will facilitate the continued operation of the 
railroad”). 
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• Fifth Circuit – court of appeals has weakened the use of § 105(a) for the payment of
pre-petition claims, but the lower courts have authorized payment under §§105(a),
362(A), 363(b), 1107, and 1108;285
• Sixth Circuit – pre-plan payments may be made under § 105(a) and the “necessity of
payment” rule;286
• Seventh Circuit – Kmart controls;
• Eight Circuit – pre-plan payments may be made under the Code;287
• Ninth Circuit – conflicting rulings;288
• Tenth Circuit – no published decisions; and
• Eleventh Circuit - § 105(a) may not be used to alter the priority scheme, but some
lower court decisions conflict.289
284 See In re NVR L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (declaring pre-petition payment could be justified if in 
the best interests of both debtor and creditors); but see In re FCX, Inc., 60 B.R. 405, 410 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986)
(reversing decision authorizing pre-petition payment because it would subordinate remaining unsecured creditors' 
claims absent requisite inequitable conduct on part of creditors). 
285 See Chiasson v. J. Louis Matherne& Assocs. (In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc.), 4 F.3d 1329, 1334 (5th Cir. 1993) (observing 
Bankruptcy Code did not give bankruptcy courts authority to debtor to use post-petition funds to satisfy pre-petition 
claims); but see In re CEI Roofing, Inc., 315 B.R. 50, 61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) (permitting pre-petition payment of wage 
claims to necessary employees under section 105 and section 507(a)(3) and (4)); 
286 See In re Quality Interiors, Inc., 127 B.R. 391, 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991)(“A general practice has developed ... 
where bankruptcy courts permit the payment of certain pre-petition claims, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105, where the 
debtor will be unable to reorganize without such payment.”). 
287 See In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543, 544-45, 547 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001)(citing section 364(b) of Bankruptcy 
Code as basis for approving debtor's lending transactions in addition to authorizing debtor to pay its critical lumber 
vendors' prepetition claims).  
288 See Burchinal v. Cent. Wash. Bank (In re Adams Apple, Inc.), 829 F.2d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that goal of 
debtor rehabilitation may warrant overriding Code's general policy of equality of creditor treatment, thereby justifying 
payment of “pre-petition wages to key employees” and “debts to providers of unique and irreplaceable supplies”); but 
see B&W Enters., Inc. v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B&W Enters., Inc.), 713 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting notion 
that pre-petition critical vendors could be paid pursuant to necessity of payment rule). 
289 Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co., Inc. (In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., Inc.), 963 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating cross 
collateralization is inconsistent with priority scheme of Bankruptcy Code). 
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Even in the presence of favorable caselaw, however, debtors may face difficult 
standards if they want to request the payment of “critical vendors” in their first day motions.  
Debtors generally must affirmatively prove that there are “no realistic alternatives to 
payment of the claims and that absent payment, the estate’s value will be seriously and 
substantially jeopardized.  The possibility of favorable trade terms will not, by itself, satisfy 
this standard.”290  However, the Bankruptcy Code may provide some support for payment 
of pre-petition claims.   The act provides that “any claim for the value of goods received by a 
debtor in the ordinary course of business within twenty days prior to commencement of its 
case will be entitled to administrative expense priority status, rather than just general 
unsecured status.”  This may allow debtors who want to pay pre-petition vendor claims an 
opportunity to do so if they pertain to goods delivered twenty days before the case 
commenced.291 
290 Mark A. McDermott, Critical Vendor and Related Orders: Kmart and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, 14 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 409 (Winter 2006). 
291 Id. 
